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ABSTRACT
Empirical evidence indicates local jurisdictions are internally more
heterogeneous than standard sorting models predict. We develop
a dynamic multi-region model, with fluctuating regional house
prices, where an owner-occupying household’s location choice
depends on its current wealth and its current “match” and
involves both consumption and investment considerations. The
relative strength of the consumption motive and the investment
motive in the location choice determines the equilibrium pattern of
residential sorting, with a strong investment (consumption)
motive implying sorting according to the match (wealth). The
model predicts a negative relation between the size of house price
fluctuations and residential sorting in the match dimension. Also,
movers should be more sorted than stayers. These predictions are
consistent with evidence from US metropolitan areas when
income, age and education are used as proxies for the match.
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A central theme in regional and urban economics has been to examine how households
sort themselves into neighborhoods and communities according income and other so-
cioeconomic characteristics. Roughly speaking, the sorting approach predicts that local
jurisdictions should be internally more homogeneous than the larger geographical or eco-
nomic unit of which they are a part. Also, the jurisdictions should diﬀer from each
other. However, recent empirical evidence reveals that there is considerable heterogeneity
within municipalities and local neighborhoods. According to Ioannides (2004), in a typical
American neighborhood, neighbors tend to diﬀer signiﬁcantly in terms of income, age and
education. Rhode and Strumpf (2003) report that heterogeneity across US municipalities
and counties, measured with respect to income and a number of other socioeconomic vari-
ables (including age, education, race, nativity, religion, owner-occupation rate and party
vote shares in presidential elections) did not increase over the period 1850-1990 although
migration costs fell, which should have made sorting easier. Davidoﬀ (2005) ﬁnds that
while the extent of sorting is generally quite small, it also varies widely across metropoli-
tan areas. The fraction of income variance explained by diﬀerences across jurisdictions is
on average approximately six percent, and it ranges from less than one percent to almost
25 percent.
As an attempt to understand the observed pattern of residential sorting, this paper
develops a dynamic sorting model, with an emphasis on housing as an important, and
sometimes risky, asset. The main prediction of the model links the degree of sorting to the
size of house price ﬂuctuations: these two should be negatively correlated. Consistent with
this prediction, we ﬁnd that in those US metropolitan areas, where house price ﬂuctuations
have been large, municipalities tend to have a rather diverse population, with the shares
of diﬀerent income, age and education groups in each municipality roughly corresponding
to the overall population structure in the metropolitan area. If price ﬂuctuations are
smaller, the municipalities tend to be internally more homogeneous, and they tend to
diﬀer more clearly from each other in terms of income, age and education, so that the
degree of residential sorting in the metropolitan area is higher.
1In addition to the main result, the model predicts that among onwer-occupying house-
holds, movers should be more sorted than stayers. Finally, there should be a non-linear
relation between wealth and mobility, so that households with intermediate wealth levels
are more mobile than the poor and the wealthy. We present some evidence in support of
these predictions as well.
Our approach is based on the following main ideas: (i) For owner-occupying households,
housing is both a consumption good and an asset, and residential location choices may
involve not only consumption but also investment considerations; essentially, expected
resale value matters. (ii) Regional house prices ﬂuctuate, and the capital gains and losses
made in the housing market play an important role in determining how a household’s
wealth evolves over time. (iii) Borrowing constraints may narrow the set of feasible
housing options, and impair a household’s ability to move.
To capture these ideas, we consider a dynamic multi-region economy, where some lo-
cations are more desirable than others. While most households derive a positive utility
premium from residing in a desirable location, the size of the premium varies between
households, depending on socioeconomic characteristics, such as household size, the age
of household heads, education or income; in the model these characteristics are summa-
rized by the household’s current “match.” With a certain probability, a region is hit by a
shock, so that its desirability ranking changes and regional house prices rise or fall. The
regional shock may reﬂect e.g. altering labor market conditions, changes in the supply of
public goods and services, or the evolution in the tastes and the needs of the population.
Alternatively, the house price dynamics may be interpreted as reﬂecting (in a reduced
form) the interaction between housing demand and supply. According to this interpre-
tation, an area is currently expensive, because housing supply has not yet increased to
absorb a positive demand shock. The resulting pattern of mean-reverting (relative) re-
gional house prices implies that while a currently popular and expensive location is, for
most households, more attractive from the consumption point of view, a currently less
popular and less expensive location oﬀers better investment opportunities.2
2In Section 2.1, we present evidence on mean-reversion.
2In each period a household chooses its location based on its current wealth and its
current match. The pattern of residential sorting, that emerges in equilibrium, depends
on the relative strength of the consumption motive and the investment motive. If regional
shocks are large and/or persistent, the consumption motive dominates. The households
make their location choices mainly by comparing current beneﬁts t r e a m s . T h e nt h e
equilibrium pattern of residential sorting essentially boils down to diﬀerences in wealth:
as a general rule, a household resides in an unpopular location if and only if it is borrowing
constrained, and cannot aﬀord a more expensive house. Since current wealth depends, in
part, on past luck in the housing market, households living in the same area may then
have little in common, except for the value of their home.3 Finally, since most households
want to live in a popular location, regional price diﬀerences, as well as capital gains and
losses realized in the housing market, are large, compared with typical household wealth.
When regional shocks are small and/or transient, the investment motive is stronger
(in relative terms, compared with the consumption motive). Caring about their future
prospects, many households, which would receive a larger immediate welfare stream from
a desirable location, voluntarily choose a less desirable area, in the hope of making capital
gains. Typically, a household resides in a desirable location, if and only if its current match
with that location is truly good. Given the empirical interpretation of the match, house-
holds living within the same jurisdiction should then resemble each other with respect to
various socioeconomic characteristics, such as household size, the age of household heads,
income or education, and diﬀerent jurisdictions should diﬀer from each other with respect
to the distribution of these observable characteristics. The fact that many households
voluntarily choose a less desirable location is also reﬂe c t e di nh o u s ep r i c e s . I ne q u i l i b -
rium, regional house price diﬀerences, and price ﬂuctuations, are small, in comparison
with typical household wealth.
Generally speaking, our framework combines themes, which are typically addressed in
two separate branches of literature. (i) Most papers on residential sorting use static gen-
3In their study of US neighborhoods, Ioannides and Seslen (2002) ﬁnd that income is a poor predictor
of household wealth. Neighborhood wealth distributions tend to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from neighborhood
income distributions.
3eral equilibrium models. Earlier sorting models4 often assumed that households diﬀer with
respect to one characteristic only (typically income), and predicted perfect stratiﬁcation
along that dimension, a prediction that did not agree with empirical evidence. The more
recent two-dimensional sorting models by Epple and Platt (1998), Epple and Sieg (1999)
and Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001) are more successful in explaining the data. In these
models, households diﬀer both with respect to income and with respect to tastes, and
there is imperfect sorting along both dimensions. An alternative approach to account for
the observed diversity of households within jurisdictions is based on the heterogeneity of
the housing stock (e.g., Nechyba (2000)). In contrast to the present paper, the atemporal
nature of these models means that housing and location choices do not involve invest-
ment considerations, and there is no feed-back from house price ﬂuctuations to household
wealth.5 On the other hand, in the sorting literature, the attractivity of diﬀerent jurisdic-
tions typically arises endogenously as a part of the equilibrium (e.g., the supply of local
public goods and services is determined in a political economy equilibrium), whereas we
take the process that determines the desirability of diﬀerent locations as given.
(ii) The second branch of literature analyzes housing wealth as an important compo-
nent of a household’s asset portfolio. While the double nature of housing, as a consumption
good and as an investment, and house price ﬂuctuations play an important role here, this
literature essentially focuses on the optimization problem of an individual household, and
the implications for residential sorting are not examined.6
A few recent papers take up a roughly similar mix of issues as we do here. In a
two-period framework, Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2008) examine tenure choice and income
heterogeneity in booming cities, where house prices rise, and home-owners, who make cap-
ital gains, may choose to stay put, even when newcomers typically earn higher incomes.
4Examples include Ellickson (1971), Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984), Epple and Romer (1989, 1991),
Henderson (1991) and Wheaton (1993). For a survey, see Ross and Yinger (1999).
5A few papers (e.g., Bénabou (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996)) analyze sorting in a dynamic
context. Even in these models, however, the households are typically assumed to be renters, and they
are also assumed to choose their location once and for all (in the ﬁrst period), so that realized capital
gains and losses do not shape the equilibrium pattern of residential sorting.
6Examples include Ranney (1981), Ioannides and Henderson (1983), Poterba (1984), Henderson and
Ioannides (1987), Bruenecker (1997), Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Cocco (2005), Sinai and Souleles
(2005) and Li and Yao (2007).
4Their model emphasizes that wealth rather than income, or tastes, can be a key deter-
minant of a household’s residential location. Consistent with their theory, they ﬁnd that
there is a positive correlation between the income dispersion in a neighborhood and the
dispersion of time since a household moved to the neighborhood. Also the related work
by Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) on house price dynamics and housing choices shares
common themes and features with our paper, although here households choose between
diﬀe r e n ta p a r t m e n tt y p e s( “ ﬂats” and “houses”) rather than between diﬀerent locations.
In particular, in Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006), as well as in our paper, capital gains
and losses made in the housing market are a key driver of household wealth dynamics,
and borrowing constraints may limit the set of feasible housing options. Glaeser and Gy-
ourko (2005) study the joint process of falling house prices and neighborhood change in
declining cities. Due to the durability of housing, a negative shock leads to a sharp fall
in housing prices, but only a slow and gradual decline in city size. Low housing costs in
a city attract low-income households. In the model, however, households are assumed to
be renters, so that realized capital losses do not aﬀect their residential location choices.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The basic model is developed in Section 2.
Section 3, which contains the main theoretical results, shows how the equilibrium pattern
of residential sorting reﬂects the relative strength of the consumption motive and the
investment motive of housing. The section also establishes a link between the size of
house price ﬂuctuations and the pattern of residential sorting, and analyzes the degree
of sorting among movers and stayers. Section 4 extends the basic model by introducing
more general match dynamics. It particular, this extension allows us to consider household
speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in expected tenure length, and endogenous correlation between wealth
and the match. Some empirical evidence is presented in Section 5. Finally Section 6
concludes.
52 The model
2.1 Some empirical background
We develop a dynamic model of residential sorting, based on the following main ideas: (i)
For owner-occupying households, housing is both a consumption good and an asset, and
residential location choices may involve not only consumption but also investment consid-
erations; essentially, expected resale value matters. (ii) Regional house prices ﬂuctuate,
and the capital gains and losses made in the housing market play an important role in
determining how a household’s wealth evolves over time. (iii) Borrowing constraints may
narrow the set of feasible housing options, and impair a household’s ability to move.
It is natural to include these elements in a framework which tries to understand
households’ location choices and residential sorting. In most developed countries, owner-
occupied housing is the single most important investment for a typical household. For
example, in the late 1990’s, single family owner-occupied housing composed 2/3 of house-
hold wealth in the UK, 1/3 of household wealth in the US, and 2/3 of the assets of a
U Sh o u s e h o l dw i t hm e d i a nw e a l t h . 7 Given the importance of housing as an asset, it is
reasonable to assume that investment considerations may also play a role when people
choose where to buy a home. One simple way to motivate this assumption is to conduct
an internet search. Our Google search with key words “location”, “home” and “resale
value” produced nearly one million hits, with headlines such as “Buying a home with a
resale value: location, location, location” abounding.
Second, house prices are often highly volatile, and in diﬀerent regions property values
tend to rise and fall asynchronously, so that relative regional prices may vary considerably
over time. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this ﬁnding with price data from ﬁve UK regions and
four US metropolitan areas.8 Relative prices can ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly even at a more
7Banks et al. (2002), Federal Reserve’s 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
8According to Shiller (1993, Ch 5 p. 79) real estate booms and busts in US cities have been regionally
asynchronized and prize movements often dramatic. Del Negro and Otrok (2007) ﬁnd that, with the
exception of the boom of the early 2000s, US house price dynamics have been mainly driven by local
or regional, rather than national, shocks. For further evidence on US prices, see also Case and Shiller
(1989), Malpezzi (1999), Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005), or Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005). For
British evidence, see Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), or Cook (2003).
6local level. In London, for example, the borough of Greenwich was 3% more expensive
than the borough of Hackney in 1995, but in 2001 prices were 20% higher in Hackney
than in Greenwich9; see also Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magné (2003). For similar ﬁndings on
the Boston metropolitan area, see Case and Mayer (1996).
The capital gains and losses made in the housing market can be remarkably large in
comparison with typical household incomes and savings, and empirical studies reveal that
falling home equity value may seriously constrain a household’s ability to move.10 To
illustrate the size of the wealth shocks, Table 1 shows maximum and minimum house-
price-to-income ratios in four major US cities over the period 1979-1996. In the UK, the
average annual capital gain in the London market between 1983 and 1988 corresponded
to 72% of the mean annual disposable household income in the UK over that period, and
exceeded by the factor of 7.8 average yearly household savings. Between 1989 and 1992,
the annual capital loss of a typical London homeowner was equivalent to 77% of average
disposable household income, and 8.4 times average household savings.
As a general rule, these housing market risks are uninsurable. Shiller (1993, 2003),
for example, lists home equity insurance as one of the key ﬁnancial markets currently
missing.11 Nevertheless, location choices and the timing of transactions can aﬀect the
distribution of risks that a household faces. While house price ﬂuctuations include an im-
portant random component, they also display certain regularities. In particular, regional
house prices tend to exhibit mean-reversion in time horizons of one year and longer;
possible explanations include lags in housing construction, mean-reversion in underlying
economic fundamentals, and the interaction of borrowing constraints and wealth eﬀects,
which gives rise to temporary overshooting of prices.12 There is also some evidence on
long-run equilibrium relationships between house prices in diﬀerent areas: if prices in a
particular location are currently above the equilibrium level, they are likely to fall, in
9Source: Land Registry, http://www.landreg.gov.uk.
10See Chan (1996, 2001), Ferreira, Gyourko and Tracy (2008), Henley (1998).
11Shiller (1993), and Shiller and Weiss (1999) discuss the potential problems, both economic and
psychological, involved in providing hedging against house price swings, as well as ways to overcome
these problems. See Shiller (1993, 2003), and Iacovello and Ortalo-Magné (2003) for discussion on some
real life experiments in the US and the UK.
12See Glaeser and Gyourko (2007), Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2005), Evenson (2003), Lamont and Stein
(1999).
7relative terms, some time in the future; if relative prices are above the equilibrium level,
t h eo p p o s i t ei sl i k e l yt oh a p p e n . 13
2.2 The basics of the economy
The economy has two locations. Each location has an equal, ﬁxed, stock of identical
houses. Each house is occupied by a single household and no one household is ever home-
less. All households are owner-occupiers and there is no rental housing. For convenience,
assume that the stock of houses and the mass of households each comprises a continuum
of size unity.
There are inﬁnite discrete time periods indexed by t =0 ,1,.... In each period, one of
the locations is deemed to be “desirable” while the other one is “less desirable”. When a
period changes, the relative ranking of the locations is reversed with probability π ∈ (0,1).
We also consider a small region interpretation of the model, with a continuum of loca-
tions. Then in each period, one half of the locations are “desirable” while the remaining
locations are “less desirable”, and when a period changes, a measure π of the locations
is hit by a regional shock. The long-run equilibrium of the model is essentially identical
under both interpretations.14
T h eh o u s e h o l d sd i ﬀer in the utility premium they derive from residing in the desirable
location. The household speciﬁc component of the premium is captured by the match, θ:
a high realization of θ implies a good match with the currently desirable location, while
a low (negative) realization implies a good match with the less desirable location.15 The
aggregate heterogeneity of households is unchanged over time, and θ has a stationary
distribution, with a cumulative distribution function G(θ), on some support [θL,θ H].
Without loss of generality, we assume that the median match θm =0 , i.e. G(0) = 1
2.
13That is, regional house prices are cointegrated. For evidence from British regions, see MacDonald
and Taylor (1993), Alexander and Barrow (1994) or Cook (2003). For evidence from US census regions,
as well as for a comparison between the US and the UK, see Meen (2002).
14A straightforward extension of the small region version of the model involves considering a case,
where in each period a measure ϕ ∈ (0,1) of the locations is desirable, while the remaining locations are
undesirable. The main results of the paper, stated as propositions, carry over to this extended framework.
15As will become clear below, even households with low realizations of θ may derive a positive premium
from the desirable location. However, even if this is the case, households with low θ lose less if they reside
in the undesirable location than households with higher realizations of θ.
8A household with current match θ receives per period utility 1
2ε+θ, when living in the
currently desirable location. The per period utility of anyone household living in the less
desirable location is −1
2ε. Here the parameter ε>0 measures regional welfare diﬀerences.
ε also gauges the size of regional shocks: if a location is hit by a shock, the utility stream
it oﬀers to the (median) household changes from 1
2ε to −1
2ε,o rv i c ev e r s a .
Given these assumptions, all households with a current match θ>−ε derive a positive
utility premium from residing in the desirable location. The measure of these households
is 1 − G(−ε) > 1
2. In particular, if θL > −ε and G(−ε)=0 , all households would rather
live in the popular area. Since the measure of houses in the desirable location is one half,
housing is in short supply in the popular region.
A household’s match may change over time. First, if the neighborhood or jurisdiction
where the household resides is hit by a regional shock, the match between the household
and the location is broken, and a new match is independently drawn from the distribu-
tion function G(θ).16 Second, even if the overall popularity of the jurisdiction remains
unaltered, between periods the match may change for some idiosyncratic, or household
speciﬁc, reason17, with probability λ ∈ [0,1], and the new match is independently drawn
from the distribution G(θ). In Section 4, we drop the assumption of independent draws,
and the match is allowed to follow a general Markov process, with possibly diﬀerent
transition dynamics after a regional and an idiosyncratic shock.
Finally, the households live forever and discount future utilities by a common factor
β ∈ (0,1).
In any period, the aggregate welfare is maximized, if all households with θ>θ m =0
are allocated to the (currently) desirable location, those with θ<0 live in the less desirable
location, and the group (always of measure zero, if G is continuous) with θ =0is divided
between the locations so that capacity constraints on housing are not violated. In other
16An underlying premise is that a location which was popular (unpopular) in period t and another
location which is popular (unpopular) in period t +1are likely to be “desirable” (“undesirable”) in
diﬀerent ways; thus it is plausible to assume that the match that the household had with the period-t
desirable (undesirable) location does not carry over to the period-(t +1 )desirable (undesirable) area.
17The match changes for similar reasons as in the search models by Wheaton (1990) and Williams
(1995). Examples include change of household size or educational status and evolution in tastes when
members of the household age.
9words, there is perfect sorting according to the match. If this allocation rule is followed,
the aggregate utility in any period is w∗ = 1
2E[θ | θ ≥ 0].
2.3 Wealth dynamics
In the market outcome, the location choice depends on not only the match, but also on
wealth. In this section, we study how a household’s wealth evolves over time.
A household cannot sell a home without buying another one, and vice versa.18 We
choose the minimum level of housing wealth as the origin and ﬁxt h ev a l u eo fac h e a ph o m e
to 0. We also normalize the house price in a popular location to 1. This normalization
means that house price swings are always of size unity. However, we shall below show
how their magnitude can be measured in a meaningful way, by comparing them with the
value of ﬁnancial assets, and with average household wealth.
Consistent with empirical evidence, we assume that capital gains and losses made in
the housing market are uninsurable.19 The incomplete markets setting we consider here
is the simplest possible one. In addition to owning a home, the households can carry
wealth to the future by holding a single risk-free, non-interest bearing ﬁnancial asset,
which can be interpreted as outside money. The real supply of money is M/p,w h e r eM is
the ﬁxed nominal supply, and 1/p is the price of money, in terms of housing (in desirable
locations).20
Denote ﬁnancial asset holdings by a and let h be housing. h is equal to 1, if the
household owns a house in a desirable location, and equal to 0, if the house is in an
18This follows from our basic assumptions: (i) no household can be homeless (being homeless would
result in very large negative utility), (ii) there is no rental housing, and (iii) the measure of homes equals
the measure of households.
19Clearly, also changes in the “match” are uninsurable.
20We could also easily introduce pure credit, or inside money, and allow the households to borrow up
to a certain limit, without changing any of the results: in the steady state, the interest rate is zero, so
that inside and outside money are perfect substitutes (see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch. 17.10).
Assume by contrast, that the interest rate is positive and only inside money is held in equilibrium. Then
in any (non-degenerate) equilibrium of a pure credit economy, with zero net supply of ﬁnancial assets,
(see Huggett (1993)) some households must have negative positions. But, since the households have no
income sources outside the housing market, a household with negative initial ﬁnancial asset holdings
exceeds any ﬁnite debt limit with a positive probability. Thus there cannot be a stationary equilibrium
with a positive rate of interest.
10undesirable location. We also deﬁne a household’s total wealth (n), which consists of
both ﬁnancial wealth (money) and housing wealth
nt = at + ht. (1)
In any given period t, the household’s budget constraint is
ht + at = at−1 +( 1− st)ht−1 + st(1 − ht−1), (2)
where st is an indicator function which is equal to 1 if there is a regional shock between
periods t − 1 and t, and 0 otherwise. Combining (1) and (2) yields
nt+1 = nt + st+1 (1 − 2ht). (3)
The household’s wealth position (n) changes if and only if the household makes a capital
gain or suﬀers a capital loss in the housing market. This stark way to model wealth
dynamics is motivated by the observation that wealth shocks realized in the housing
market can be remarkably large compared with typical household incomes and savings.21
If, prior to the regional shock, the household owned a property in a then unpopular
location, (ht =0 ) the household makes a capital gain and climbs one rung in the wealth
ladder; if the house was in an expensive area (ht =1 ) before the change of fortunes, the
household suﬀers a loss and falls one rung down.
There is a lower limit for ﬁnancial asset holdings amin,t h a tah o u s e h o l di sn o ta l l o w e dt o
exceed. A simple and fairly natural normalization is adopted here by ﬁxing the minimum
21In an earlier version of the paper, we considered an extension of the model, with more general wealth
dynamics at the aggregate level. In each period some households exit the economy (or die), while new
households enter. The wealth of the exiting households is passed on to the newcomers, but the mapping
is not one-to-one. Technically, it is assumed that each newcomer has an endowment of a representative
consumption good, which it sells to the exiting households, and the size of the endowment varies between
households. At the aggregate level, wealth dynamics, as well as the stationary wealth distribution, then
depend on the wealth distribution of the new households, as well as on capital gains and losses made in
the housing markets. We showed that the main empirical prediction of the paper emerges also from this
extended model: the degree of residential sorting in the match dimension is negatively correlated with
t h es i z eo fh o u s ep r i c eﬂuctuations.
11balance to be zero, amin =0 , but allowing a negative minimum balance would just involve
a change of origin, without altering the analysis or any of the results.22 Since the minimum
wealth level is n =0(the minimum level of housing wealth is 0, and the minimum level
of ﬁnancial asset holdings is 0) and since households make capital gains and losses of size
unity, we can now assume, without loss of generality, that wealth only takes non-negative
integer values n =0 ,1,2,.... At wealth levels n ≥ 1, a household may freely choose its
housing location, and its wealth portfolio may consist of n units of ﬁnancial assets and a
cheap house (h =0 ) ,o rn − 1 units of ﬁnancial wealth and an expensive home (h =1 ) .
If n =0 , t h eh o u s e h o l do w n sah o u s ei na nu n d e s i r a b l el o c a t i o n ,h =0 , and since it has
no money, a = amin =0 ,i tc a n n o ta ﬀord a house in a desirable location: choosing h =1
would imply a = −1 <a min, and this is not allowed. The borrowing constraint that limits
a household’s location choices can be expressed as follows:
ht =0if nt =0 . (4)
2.4 The household’s problem




















subject to (3) and (4). The problem can be conveniently presented in a recursive form.
Let V (θ,n) be the (ex post) value function of a household with current type θ and
current wealth n.A l s od e ﬁne the household’s ex ante value function V (n)=Eθ [V (θ,n)],
which describes the household’s expected prospects when the household faces a shock
(idiosyncratic or regional) and does not yet know its new match. The value function
22This is because the interest rate is zero. See Aiyagari (1994) or Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch.
17.10). See also footnote 20 above.
12V (θ,n) satisﬁes the Bellman equation







− (1 − h) 1
2ε + β {(1 − π)[(1− λ)V (θ,n)+λV (n)]
+π[(1 − h)V (n +1 )+hV (n − 1)]}
(5)
subject to (4). In the current period, the household’s utility is −1
2ε or 1
2ε + θ, depending
on its location choice. Its prospects for the next period are discounted by β and are given
inside the curly brackets. With probability (1 − π)(1− λ) the household is not exposed
to any shocks, and it will face the same value function V (θ,n) as today. With the
complementary probability [1 − (1 − π)(1− λ)] the match is broken and the household’s
prospects are captured by the ex ante value function. If the match changes for household
speciﬁc reasons, the wealth of the household remains unaltered and future welfare is given
by V (n). If there is a regional shock, not only the match changes, but also house prices
rise or fall, and depending on housing location, the household makes a capital gain or
suﬀers a capital loss, resulting in expected future welfare V (n +1 )or V (n − 1).
At each unconstrained wealth level n ≥ 1, the household chooses the desirable location
if and only if
θ + ε>π β[V (n +1 )− V (n − 1)]. (6)
The condition (6) involves a useful decomposition of the decision problem into the con-
sumption motive, ﬁguring on the left-hand side, and the investment motive, visible on
the right-hand side. The strength of the consumption motive depends on the current
match θ and the measure of regional disparities ε. If there were no need to care about
the future, all households with θ>−ε would choose the currently desirable region, while
only those with θ<−ε would (voluntarily) live in the less popular area. The downside
of choosing a currently popular and expensive location is that a household may suﬀer
capital losses, if regional house prices fall, and may then be borrowing constrained in the
future, when the match θ with an expensive location is better than today. By contrast,
opting for a currently less popular and less expensive area entails the chance of making
capital gains. These considerations are captured by the investment motive. Due to the
investment motive, even some households with θ>−ε, i.e. households whose immediate
13beneﬁts are higher in the desirable location, may voluntarily choose the unpopular area.







θH if n =0
−ε + πβ[V (n +1 )− V (n − 1)] if n ≥ 1
(7)












Figure 3 shows the critical match θ
∗
n with diﬀerent values of n when θ is uniformly distrib-
uted on [−1
2, 1
2],ε=1 ,β= .95,a n dπ = .3. Clearly, θ
∗
n decreases with n,a n dw e a l t h i e r
households are ready to choose the desirable location even with a more modest match.
This is a general property of θ
∗
n, and it stems from the fact that the ex ante value function
is concave. (Concavity is proved in the appendix.) Also, this ﬁnding has a natural inter-
pretation. Assets are valued since they provide the option to make unconstrained choices
in the future. However, if a household is wealthy, additional assets are of less value: the
more assets the household has, the more distant is the prospect of being borrowing con-
strained at some point in the future. To put it diﬀerently, the investment motive is more
important for poor households than for wealthy households.
The appendix shows that at very high wealth levels, the investment motive all but
vanishes, and as a consequence limn→∞θ
∗
n = −ε. T h a ti s ,t h em a j o r i t yo fs u ﬃciently
wealthy households live in expensive locations. This property is needed, when we establish
the equilibrium of the model. In particular, if θL > −ε — and all households prefer the
desirable location from the consumption point of view — there is a ﬁnite wealth level n,
such that all households with n ≥ n choose a desirable location. In Figure 3, θL = −1
2 >
−1=−ε, and n =3 .
142.5 Equilibrium
The previous section showed how a household chooses its location, and its asset portfolio,
based on its current wealth and its current match. On the other hand, a household’s
current wealth depends on its past fortunes in the housing market, and its past location
and portfolio choices. Then the long-run wealth distribution is induced by the households’
policy rule. Location choices and the stationary wealth distribution together constitute
the long-run equilibrium of the model.
Denote by f (n) the size of wealth class n. Given the households’ location choice
rule (8), f1
n−1 (n)=( 1 − G(θ
∗
n))f (n) is then the frequency of households at wealth




n)f (n) denote the frequency of households at wealth level n,o w n i n ga
cheap home (h =0 )and n units of ﬁnancial assets. The appendix shows that the long-run
equilibrium is characterized by the set of equations
f
1
n (n +1 )=f
0
n (n),n =0 ,1,... (9)
and the wealth distribution is implicitly deﬁned by the sequence





n+1). These equations hold both under the two-locations and the
atomistic-locations version of the model: both model variants have the same long-run
equilibrium.23 The wealth distribution is single-peaked, with wealth classes in the middle
having more mass than those on the tails, and the right tail can be approximated by a
power series24; these properties are consistent with observed empirical wealth distribu-
23The environment that an individual household faces is identical in both model variants: there is a
regional shock with probability π. Then the households’ location choices, analyzed in Section 2.4, are
identical in both cases.










15tions. In the hump of the wealth distribution γ(n) ≈ 1,25 meaning that the critical match
θ
∗
n is relatively close to θm: interestingly, in the hump the households’ location choice rule
(summarized by θ
∗
n) tends to be relatively close to the socially optimal rule, while in the
tails location choices deviate more from the socially optimal policy. Equations (9) imply
that the distribution of ﬁnancial assets is identical in both locations — or location types.
This symmetry property means that in steady state the asset side of the economy, as
deﬁned by the joint distribution of housing wealth and ﬁnancial wealth, looks exactly the
same at the end of any given period and at the beginning of the subsequent period even
if the popularity ranking of the locations is reversed.
Let us turn to housing markets. Due to the borrowing constraint, households at
the lowest wealth level, n =0 , can only aﬀord a cheap home. This implies the restric-
tion f1
−1 (0) = 0. On the other hand, the majority of suﬃciently wealthy households
chooses an expensive location. In particular, the fact that limn→∞ θ
∗









1−G(−ε) < 1 for h ∈ {0,1}, so that the sequences
fh
n−h (n),h∈ {0,1}, converge. Using these results, and summing both sides of (9) over






n−1 (n). Finally, given that the aggregate









These equations indicate that the demand for housing, on the left-hand side, is equal to





, in both locations. Households’ location choices together with
the endogenously arising long-run wealth distribution guarantee that housing markets
clear. Essentially, if few households willingly choose the less desirable location, in the
long-run equilibrium many households end up living there because they are borrowing
constrained.
In addition to the households’ location choice rule and the wealth distribution, the
third constituent of the equilibrium is the relative price of housing and ﬁnancial assets,
p.T o s o l v e f o r p, consider the asset market clearing condition E [a]=M
p , where the
25The mode of the distribution is a wealth level nmod such that γ (nmod − 1) > 1 and γ (nmod) < 1.
16left-hand side is the aggregate demand for ﬁnancial assets and the right-hand side is the
net supply, equal to real outside money.26 Using (1) and the housing market equilibrium
E [h]=1
2, the asset market equilibrium condition can be rewritten as E [n]=1
2 + M
p ,a n d
the relative price of housing and ﬁnancial assets is27
p =
M
E [n] − 1
2
. (12)
Notice that p also measures the monetary size of house price ﬂuctuations.28
3 Residential sorting
3.1 Main patterns
This section studies how the equilibrium pattern of residential sorting, as well as the size
of house price ﬂuctuations, reﬂects the relative strength of the consumption motive and
the investment motive of housing. We begin by analyzing social welfare. Addressing this
normative issue will then allow us to characterize sorting, since in the present model high
social welfare is associated with location choices based on the match, rather than wealth.
The expected prospects of households at wealth level n are given by the ex ante value
function V (n)=Eθ [V (θ,n)]. To get a measure of social welfare, we sum over all wealth




f (n)V (n). (13)
26The equilibrium we establish here essentially resembles the equilibrium of the simple Bewley-type
model considered by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch 17.10.4), where outside money and inside money





f(n) = limn→∞ γ (n)=
G(−ε)
1−G(−ε) < 1. Thus the sum E [n] ≡
P∞
n=0 nf (n)
converges, and E [n] is always ﬁnite.
28If the households are allowed to borrow in terms of ﬁnancial assets, and the borrowing limit, de-
noted in monetary terms, is −B, the asset market equilibrium condition reads E [a]=M+B
p ,a n d
p =( M + B)/
¡








E [θ | h =1 ]
1 − β
. (14)
Essentially, social welfare reﬂects the degree of residential sorting in the match dimension,
summarized by the average quality of the match in the desirable location. The equality
(14) is needed in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 1 Social welfare increases, when (i) the size of regional shocks (ε)d e c r e a s e s ,
or (ii) regional shocks become more frequent (π increases).
Proof See the appendix.
Proposition 2 When (i) the size of regional shocks (ε) decreases or (ii) the regional
shocks become more frequent (π increases), the degree of residential sorting in the match
dimension increases in the following sense. (a) In each location h ∈ {0,1}, the average
match E [θ | h] becomes more distinct from the economywide average E [θ]. (b) The lo-
cations become more distinct from each other and the between-locations variance of the
match increases. (c) The locations become internally more homogeneous in the sense that
the within-location variance of the match decreases.
Proof When conditions (i) and/or (ii) hold, it follows from Proposition 1 that E [θ | h =1 ]
increases. (a) Then, since 1
2E [θ | h =1 ]+1
2E [θ | h =0 ]=E [θ],a n dE [θ] is a constant,
it follows that E [θ | h =0 ]decreases. Thus the diﬀerence |E [θ | h] − E [θ]| increases for
h ∈ {0,1}.( b)I t e m( a) implies that the between-locations variance Va r(E [θ | h]) =
1
2 (E [θ | h =0 ]− E [θ])
2 + 1
2 (E [θ | h =1 ]− E [θ])
2 increases. (c) The economywide vari-
ance of the match Va r(θ) can be decomposed Va r(θ)=Va r(E [θ | h])+E [Va r(θ | h)].
Since Va r(θ) is a constant, it follows from item (b) that the within-locations component
E [Va r(θ | h)] must decrease.
To understand these results, recall that the basic allocation problem in the economy
arises since there is not enough housing capacity in desirable locations to accommodate
all households with a positive utility premium. Essentially, social welfare is high, if the
18allocation problem is mainly solved through self-selection, based on the goodness of the
match, while welfare is low, if few households willingly choose a less desirable location,
and wealth determines who lives where.
Next remember that households’ location choices reﬂect a trade-oﬀ between the con-
sumption motive and the investment motive of housing. An increase in interregional wel-
fare diﬀerences, and the size of regional shocks, ε, strengthens the consumption motive
to choose a desirable location in the current period. On the other hand, it also reinforces
the incentives to accumulate assets (investment motive), since a household stands to lose
more if it faces the borrowing constraint at some point in the future. However, since
future utility losses are discounted and only occur by chance, while the higher welfare
stream is available right away, the eﬀect on the consumption motive dominates. Hence,
the larger the regional diﬀerences or shocks, the less likely an unconstrained household
chooses a currently undesirable area.
A change in the frequency of regional shocks, π, aﬀects only the investment motive,
while leaving the consumption motive intact. The higher π, the more likely a household
living in a popular area suﬀers a capital loss, while the more likely a household living
in an unpopular area makes a capital gain. Then, at any unconstrained wealth level,
a household is more willing to choose a currently undesirable location. The preceding
discussion is summarized by
Lemma 1 For all n ≥ 1,
dθ∗
n




Proof See the appendix.
Changes in the relative strength of the consumption motive and the investment motive
also aﬀect the wealth distribution.
Lemma 2 When regional shocks become smaller (ε decreases) or more frequent (π in-
creases), the wealth distribution shifts to the right, in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance. In particular, the size of the borrowing constrained group decreases.
Proof Deﬁne the cumulative distribution function F (n;ε,π)=
Pn
i=0 f (i).B y L e m m a
1, the θ
∗




n+1), so that by (10) the ratio f (n +1 )/f (n)=γ(n) goes up for all n =0 ,1,....I t
follows that dF (n;ε,π)/dε ≥ 0 and dF (n;ε,π)/dπ ≤ 0,f o re a c hn =0 ,1,....
Combining these elements leads to the results stated in Propositions 1 and 2. When the
investment motive is strong, and the households care a lot about their future prospects,
housing markets are mainly cleared through self-selection, which results in a high degree of
sorting in the match dimension, and high social welfare. When the consumption motive is
strong, market clearing relies on a larger group of households being borrowing constrained;
this gives rise to a low degree of sorting in the match dimension, and a low level of social
welfare.
Above we examined how changes in the size and the frequency of regional shocks
aﬀect the mechanism through which housing markets clear. On the other hand, when
a household chooses its housing location, it simultaneously chooses the composition of
its wealth portfolio. Then Lemmas 1 and 2 can be (re)interpreted from the asset market
point of view. In particular, a strong investment motive drives up the demand for ﬁnancial
assets, and their relative price 1/p. As a result, the share of ﬁnancial assets in total
wealth, E [a]/E [n]=( E [n]− 1
2)/E [n], increases, while the share of housing (in popular
locations), 1
2/E [n], decreases. An upshot of the greater valuation of ﬁnancial assets is
that house price ﬂuctuations (the size of which is normalized to unity) become smaller,
compared with the value of ﬁnancial wealth a, as well as total wealth n. Then a wealth
shock has a smaller impact on a household’s (relative) wealth position, and a typical
household is better equipped to withstand capital losses:
Remark 1 Assume that regional shocks become smaller (ε decreases) or more frequent
(π increases). Then (i) the monetary size of house price ﬂuctuations, p, decreases, and
(ii) the price ﬂuctuations become smaller compared with household wealth, measured by
average wealth E [n], median wealth, or any other quantile nq of the wealth distribution,
where nq =m i n n, s.t. q ≤ F (n).
Combining Remark 1 with Proposition 2 allows us to establish a connection between
the size of house price ﬂuctuations and the degree of residential sorting.
20Corollary 1 The smaller or the more frequent the regional shocks are, (i) the smaller
are house price ﬂuctuations and (ii) the more residential sorting there is in the match
dimension.
Much of our empirical work reported in Section 5 is based on Proposition 2 and
Corollary 1.
Next we proceed to analyzing sorting in the wealth dimension. Above we noted that
the distribution of ﬁnancial assets is identical in both location types. Then, given that
E [a | h =1 ]=E [a | h =0 ], interregional wealth diﬀerences derive entirely from diﬀerent
house values
E [n | h =1 ]− E [n | h =0 ]=E [h | h =1 ]− E [h | h =0 ]=1 . (15)
To assess the magnitude of these interregional wealth diﬀerences in a meaningful way, we
compare them with typical household wealth in the economy:
Proposition 3 When regional shocks become larger (ε increases) or less frequent (π de-
creases), interregional wealth diﬀerences become larger compared with typical household
wealth, as measured by average wealth, median wealth or any other quantile of the wealth
distribution.
Proof The result follows from equation (15) and Lemma 2.
The following proposition is about polar cases.
Proposition 4 (a) When ε → 0 or δ ≡
πβ
1−β(1−π) → 1, there is perfect sorting in the
match dimension and no sorting in the wealth dimension. In any given period, a household
chooses a desirable location if and only if θ>θ m.( b )I fθL+ε>π β
E[θ]−θL
1−β ,t h e r ei sp e r f e c t
sorting in the wealth dimension and no sorting in the match dimension. A household
resides in a less desirable location if and only if it is borrowing constrained.
Proof See the appendix.
The equilibrium pattern of residential sorting, with diﬀerent values of ε, is illustrated
in Figure 4. In each panel, the cumulative wealth distribution is measured on the hori-
21zontal axis, and the cumulative match distribution on the vertical axis. Then area has
a simple frequency mass interpretation (with one quarter of the area of the unit square
corresponding to one quarter of the households etc.). The ﬁgure shows a clear pattern,
with the degree of residential sorting in the match dimension decreasing, and the degree
of wealthwise sorting increasing, as the size of the regional shocks grows. Also the mag-
nitude of house price ﬂuctuations, measured by P ≡ 1
2
1
E[n], P ∈ [0,1],g r o w st o g e t h e r
with the size of the shocks (see Remark 1). Panels a (no shocks) and d (large shocks)
correspond to polar cases, with perfect sorting in the match dimension and in the wealth
dimension, respectively (and no sorting in the complementary dimension). Panels b and
c are intermediate cases, with shocks of intermediate size, and imperfect sorting along
both dimensions. A similar set of ﬁgures could be also presented with respect to π.
3.2 Movers and stayers
In this section we establish a relation between wealth and household mobility, and study
the degree of residential sorting among movers and stayers.
We begin by demonstrating a simple humpshaped relation between wealth and mo-
bility. Take any given wealth class n. At the beginning of any period, the portion
1 − G(θ
∗
n) of households own a house in the desirable location; since equations (9) hold
in the steady state, this is true even after a regional shock. Between any two peri-
ods, (1 − s)λ + s households are hit by a shock, which breaks their match. Then the
share ((1 − s)λ + s)G(θ
∗
n) of the households, which are in the popular area at the be-
ginning of the period, get a realization θ<θ
∗
n and move to the unpopular area. There-
fore, mobility from the desirable to the undesirable location in wealth class n is equal to




n)]. Likewise, it is easy to conclude that mobility from the
undesirable to the desirable location equals the same measure. Then overall mobility in










C l e a r l y ,t h e r ei sm o r em o b i l i t yi nt h o s ep e r i o d sw h e nt h ee c o n o m yi sh i tb yar e g i o n a l
22shock and s =1 . Under the atomistic locations interpretation, in any given period,
mobility at wealth level n is μ(n)=( ( 1− π)λ + π)e μ(G(θ
∗
n)). Notice also that in the
two-region case, μ(n) is the long-run average mobility at wealth level n.
Essentially, μ(n) or μ(n), deﬁnes a humpshaped relation between wealth and mobil-
ity29:
Proposition 5 Assume that n ≥ 2. Then mobility is increasing in wealth at low wealth
levels, and decreasing in wealth at high wealth levels, so that households at intermediate
wealth levels are more mobile than the poor and the wealthy.
Proof Equation (16) implies that e μ(G) is a downward opening parabola, with its peak
at G(θm)=1
2.A l s oe μ(G)=0at the extreme points G =0and G =1 .A c c o r d i n g t o
Proposition 1, θ
∗
n, and thus G(θ
∗
n),i sd e c r e a s i n gi nn.A l s o ,G(θ
∗
n) > 1
2 at low values of n,
with G(θ
∗
0)=1 . On the other hand G(θ
∗
n) < 1
2 at high levels of n,s i n c elimn→∞ θ
∗
n = −ε
and G(−ε) < 1
2. In particular, if θL > −ε we have G(θ
∗
n)=0for all n ≥ n,w h e r en<∞.
This pattern of mobility essentially reﬂects the varying strength of the investment mo-
tive at diﬀerent wealth levels. Rich households, with a weak investment motive, typically
want to live in a popular location, and only rarely ﬁnd it optimal to move. Poor house-
holds tend to reside in a cheap location; for the borrowing constrained this is obviously
the only alternative. At intermediate levels of wealth, the investment motive is neither
extremely strong nor very weak; when the match is broken, these households often ﬁnd
it optimal to change location. Maximum mobility is attained, if the location choice rule
θ
∗
n corresponds to the socially optimal median rule θm. As discussed in Section 2.5, in the
mode of the wealth distribution, households location choices tend to deviate relatively
29Notice that the measure μ(n) (or μ(n)) answers the following question: Assume that a household
has wealth n in a given period t. What is the probability that the household moves during the period?
An alternative question might be: What is the probability that the household lives in diﬀerent locations



















. If there is no regional
shock between periods t and t +1(that is, st+1 =0 ), there is a humpshaped relation between wealth
and mobility, as measured by e μ(n). If there is a regional shock (st+1 =1 ), the relation may take many
possible forms, including humpshaped and monotonously increasing.
23little from the socially optimal policy. Then, typically, the most mobile households are
found in the hump of the wealth distribution, while the least mobile are in the tails.
Remarkably, the relationship between wealth and mobility established in Proposition
5 is essentially the same as empirically documented by Henley (1998) for the UK; see
especially Figure 2 in Henley (1998). According to Henley (1998, p.425), ”levels of housing
wealth are an important factor in explaining mobility, and the relationship between the
two is not linear.” British households with large negative housing equity are virtually
immobile. Also very wealthy households tend to move relatively little. Households with
intermediate levels of wealth are the most mobile.
Next we proceed to comparing the degree of residential sorting among movers and
stayers. In any given period, we classify as a mover a household which has moved during
that period. The following results are proved in the appendix.
Proposition 6 (a) In both location types, movers have a better match with their (new)
home region than stayers, in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. (b) Movers
are more sorted than stayers in the match dimension.
When interpreting item (a) of the proposition, remember that a good match with a
cheap location means that a household has a low realization of θ.
Item (a)r e ﬂects the fact that those who move from one location to another tend to
have rather strong match-related reasons to make that choice, while those who stay put
m a yd os ol a r g e l yb e c a u s et h e yh a v eb e e nl u c k yo ru n l u c k yi nt h eh o u s i n gm a r k e t .F o r
example, households which move from a desirable location to an undesirable location,
choose a cheap area, although they could aﬀord a more expensive house (their former
home). By contrast, at least a part of the old residents live in a cheap location because
they have been locked in by falling home equity values. Likewise, in an expensive region,
newcomers from cheaper locations tend to have a good match with the area they have
chosen, whereas old residents, who may have bought their home before the rise of local
house prices, often stay put even with a more modest match.30 Item (b)i sar a t h e r
30More generally, and more formally, the appendix shows that in cheap locations, the wealth distribution
of movers ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the wealth distribution of stayers, while in the expensive
24straightforward corollary of item (a). Since movers are better matched with their home
region than stayers in both location types, movers are obviously more sorted than stayers.
The empirical work on movers and stayer reported in Section 5 is based on item (b).
4 More general match dynamics
In this section, we drop the assumption that, after a shock, the new match is independently
drawn, and allow the match to follow a general Markov process. This extension introduces
two new features to the model. First, the strength of the investment motive may reﬂect
expected tenure length and household speciﬁc moving plans. Second, wealth and the
match can be correlated.
There are J ≥ 2 diﬀerent match realizations. If the match changes for idiosyncratic, or
household speciﬁc, reasons (s =0 ), the transition probabilities from one match to another
are given by a transition matrix Λ0. If there is a regional shock (s =1 ), the transitions are
governed by a (possibly) diﬀerent matrix Λ1. To guarantee the existence of a stationary
joint distribution for wealth and the match, we adopt the small region interpretation of
the model, and assume that there is a continuum of atomistic locations. In each period, a
measure π of the matches is broken due to regional shocks, and a measure λ for household
speciﬁcr e a s o n s .L e tπ = ξσ and λ =( 1− ξ)σ, where σ ∈ (0,1) is the overall probability
that the match is broken, and ξ ∈ (0,1] measures the relative frequency of regional and
idiosyncratic shocks. The parameter σ can be interpreted as reﬂecting the overall degree
of turbulence in the economy. The stationary marginal distribution of the match is deﬁned
as the eigenvector associated with a unit eigenvalue of Λ0,w h e r eΛ ≡ (1 − ξ)Λ0 + ξΛ1.31
Notice that if the frequency of shocks (σ) changes, but the relative probabilities of regional
and idiosyncratic shocks (ξ and 1−ξ) remain constant, the stationary match distribution
is unaltered.
Next we proceed to studying households’ location choices. The value function V (θ,n)
locations, the opposite is true.
31We assume that the matrix Λ is indecomposable, so that it induces a unique long-run match distri-
bution, but otherwise we do not impose any restrictions on the structure of the stochastic matrices Λ0
and Λ1.
25satisﬁes the Bellman equation
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subject to (4). At any unconstrained wealth level n ≥ 1, the household chooses a currently
desirable location if and only if













Importantly, the investment motive, ﬁguring on the right-hand side of (18) now depends
on not only the household’s wealth position, but also on the current match θ (and on
the distribution of future matches e θ, conditional on the current match). Intuitively, the
connection between the match and the investment motive may be interpreted as reﬂecting
the household’s expected tenure length, and future moving plans. The investment motive
tends to be weak, if the household is attached to the home area, and wants to live there
even when the area is unpopular: it does not matter, if local house prices fall, since the
household has no intentions to sell. In a similar vein, Sinai and Souleles (2005) argue, that
onwer occupation is not risky, if a household intends to stay put for a long time. In our
framework, attachment to home can be modelled by letting the match be correlated with
regional shocks: the household is likely to draw a high realization of θ, when the home area
is “desirable,” and a low realization of θ, when the home area is “undesirable.” Conversely,
the investment motive tends to be strong, if the household buys a home knowing that it
will probably not live there for a long time. Then a major function of the current house is
to serve as a springboard to the future home. In particular, if the household is planning to
move to a popular and expensive area in the future32, it has an incentive to avoid housing
market risks, which might jeopardize these plans. In sum, condition (18) indicates that
a household is likely to buy a home in an expensive location (i) if it has a good match
with that location, (ii) if it is wealthy and (iii) if it is planning to stay in the location for
32Formally, the household expects to draw a high realization of θ in the future.
26al o n gt i m e .
In addition to households’ location choices, the second component of the long-run equi-
librium is the endogenous stationary joint distribution of wealth and the match. Unlike
in the basic model, wealth and the match are typically not independently distributed.33
If households are attached to a home region, a positive correlation between the value of
the match, θ, and household wealth naturally arises. This is illustrated in Figure 5. In
equilibrium, those households, which derive the highest utility premium from residing in
an expensive location, also tend to be wealthy. Typically, these households have seen the
value of their house go up, as their home region has become more popular and more ex-
pensive. This coevolution of housing costs and household wealth is one of the advantages
of owner occupation, discussed by Sinai and Souleles (2005).
While attachment to home, and the resulting positive correlation between wealth an
the match, may seem a rather natural case to consider, the model is ﬂexible enough to
allow for many other alternatives as well. For example, if some households constantly
derive a high utility premium from residing in a currently popular and expensive area,
ad i ﬀerent pattern arises. Those who insist on living in a fashionable location in every
period, have to move against the tide, from an area of fading popularity and falling
prices to an area of high prices. Then in equilibrium, the size of the utility premium and
household wealth tend to be negatively correlated.
Overall, since expected tenure length and future moving plans may aﬀect households’
location choices, and since wealth and the match tend to be correlated, the equilibrium
is typically more complex than in the basic model. Nevertheless, the main message of
the paper carries over: The pattern of residential sorting reﬂects the relative strength of
the consumption motive and the investment motive. In particular, there is a negative
correlation between the size of house price ﬂuctuations and the degree of sorting in the
match dimension. This is illustrated in Figure 5, where panel a corresponds to a situation
with small regional shocks, a strong (in relative terms) investment motive, small house
33Correlation arises, since (i) current wealth depends on past location and portfolio choices (and luck),
(ii) past choices were inﬂuenced by past match realizations, and (iii) the current match is correlated
with past match realizations. The vector diﬀerence equation, which implicitly deﬁnes the long-run joint
distribution is presented in the appendix. The appendix also establishes the equilibrium of the model.
27price ﬂuctuations, and a high degree of sorting in the match dimension. In panel b regional
shocks are larger, and the consumption motive dominates; then price ﬂuctuations are more
pronounced, and sorting takes place mainly in the wealth dimension.
More formally, the appendix proves that the main results of the paper, Propositions
1, 2 and 3, and Corollary 1, still hold, with the exception that π is substituted by σ.( A
change in π would also alter the stationary match distribution.) If λ =0 , so that there
are no idiosyncratic shocks, these results hold verbatim.
5 Empirical evidence
We conduct our empirical analysis by using data from the US metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs) and local municipalities (so called Minor Civil Divisions or MCDs). The
data are from the 1990 decennial census. For a detailed description of the data and their
sources, see the appendix.
There is much discussion on large house price ﬂuctuations in various MSAs, while
residential sorting across MCDs, in particular, has been found to be much weaker than
many conventional sorting models predict (see Rhode and Strumpf (2003)). We ﬁrst
examine how house price variations in the MSAs are related to the degree of residential
sorting. By Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, we expect that MCDs within MSAs that have
experienced large house price ﬂuctuations should have diverse populations in the sense
that the shares of diﬀerent demographic groups of the MCDs by and large correspond
to the population structure of the underlying MSA. On the other hand, MCDs in areas
where prices have been less volatile should have a less diverse population, with certain
demographic groups under- or overrepresented, compared with the MSA average.34
As Rhode and Strumph (2003), we proxy household types by characteristics such as
income, education and age. Several sorting measures for these proxies are possible. In the
literature, it is common to apply the dissimilarity index and the Gini coeﬃcient. These
indices vary between zero (when each type is equally represented in each community)
34Here we adopt an interpretation of the model, where a location corresponds to a MCD, while the
entire economy is the MSA.
28and one (when the types are completely sorted across municipalities).35 The dissimilarity
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where Smi is the share of age, education or income group m in the population of the MCD
i, Sm is the corresponding share at the MSA level, Ni is the population of MCD i and
N is the population of the MSA. An alternative sorting index derives from the Theil’s











Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) call T as the Theil’s information theory index.36 As with
D and GC above, T varies between zero (when Smi = Sm for all i,m)a n do n e( a l l
municipalities contain members of one type only). The index T can be interpreted as one
minus the ratio of the average within-municipality population diversity to the diversity
of the total MSA population (see Reardon and Firebaugh (2002, p. 42)). Essentially, the
indices D, GC and T rank the MSAs by the degree of residential sorting.
As a measure of house price ﬂuctuations we use the standard deviation of the house
price pit of the MSA i over the sample period 1985-2000, where pit =l o g ( PI it/PIt), PI it is
the house price index in MSA i in period t,a n dPI t is the US house price index in period
t.37 Basically, this measure ranks MSAs by the degree at which their house prices have
ﬂuctuated against the US average. As an alternative indicator of the size of house price
swings we used the measure maxt(pit)−mint(pit). The empirical results were qualitatively
similar.
Table 2 reports sample correlations between the alternative sorting measures of dif-
35For additional properties of the indices see Rhode and Strumph (2003).
36The formula in (21) is the same as (15) in Rhode and Strumph (2003), but is equivalent to the index
H of Reardon and Firebaugh (2002, Table 1).
37The price index data are from the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.
29ferent type characteristics and the measure of house price volatility. Consistent with our
theory, each sorting measure is negatively correlated with house price volatility. Thus,
MCDs within MSAs subject to high house price volatility tend to be less sorted than
MCDs in MSAs with little house price variation, and vice versa. As a robustness check,
we computed the standard deviation of pit over the subsample 1985-1990, which predates
our cross-section. Also this measure of house price volatility is negatively correlated with
all the sorting indices.
A potential concern is that the observed correlation between residential sorting and
house price volatility might arise from factors beyond the mechanism suggested by our
theory. Therefore, to examine the robustness of the correlations, we run OLS regressions
of diﬀerent sorting measures on house price volatility and selected covariates.
We report our baseline regression results in Table 3. In column (1), (2) and (3),
respectively, the dependent variable is income sorting, education sorting, and age sorting,
all measured by the Theil information theory index in (21). In all the regressions, the
coeﬃcient estimate of house price volatility is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level (applying t-tests based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors). Therefore,
residential sorting and house price volatility appear to be correlated even if we partial
out the eﬀects of the applied control variables. If the dissimilarity index D or the Gini
coeﬃcient GC is used as the measure of sorting in the baseline regression, the coeﬃcient
estimate of house price volatility is still always negative and statistically signiﬁcant at
least at the 5% level.
The coeﬃcient estimates of the control variables of Table 3 have meaningful interpre-
tations whenever they are statistically signiﬁcant. For example, the coeﬃcient estimate of
the number of MCDs is positive in all regressions, which is consistent with the idea that a
l a r g en u m b e ro fM C D so ﬀer more opportunities for forming diﬀerent homogeneous groups
than a small number of MCDs.38 On the other hand, the negative coeﬃcient estimate of
38In particular, if the number of MCDs is less than the number of diﬀerent types, it is not possible
to achieve maximal sorting in the sense that each type resides in a separate region (cf. Eberts and
Gronberg (1981)). In our case, the number of income groups (25) exceeds the number of MCDs in many
metropolitan areas. As a robustness check, we recomputed the sorting indices with four income groups
(formed by merging the original groups). In our baseline regression the coeﬃcient of the number MCDs
was no longer statistically signiﬁcant. Otherwise, however, the results were qualitatively the same.
30the average population size of MCDs is in line with the idea that a large population in
an MCD can encompass a larger range of households than a small population, and thus,
ceteris paribus, tends to reduce sorting across regions. We expect that sorting may be
more beneﬁcial in urbanized areas with high population density than in rural areas with
low population density. We also expect that larger MSA areas are likely to provide more
opportunities for beneﬁcial sorting than small metro areas (cf. Hoxby (2000)). In line
with these assertions, the coeﬃcient estimates of the density of the MSA and the area size
of the MSA are positive when they are statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, the negative (and
weakly signiﬁcant) coeﬃcient estimate of the number of families in MSA in column (1)
suggests that it is harder to obtain homogeneous income groups from a large population
than from a small population, ceteris paribus.
Recent literature indicates that physical and regulatory constraints, which hinder hous-
ing construction, may have signiﬁcant implications for the house price dynamics and the
development of the MSAs. Obviously, such constraints might induce correlation between
residential sorting and house price volatility. To control for such eﬀects, we augment
our baseline regressions with variables that measure the degree of physical and regulatory
constraints of the MSAs. The variables are the “land topographic unavailability measure”
(UNDEV) of Saiz (2008) and the “Wharton Residential Urban Land Regulation Index”
(WRLURI) of Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008). The former (the latter) variable is
available for 83 (208) MSAs in our original sample. We ﬁnd that the two variables are
correlated with our sorting measures and the measure of house price volatility, while it
turns out that only WRLURI is a statistically signiﬁcant explanatory variable in our base-
line regressions. When WRLURI is added to the regressions, the coeﬃcient estimate of
house price volatility remains negative and statistically signiﬁcant; in fact the coeﬃcient
increases in absolute value39 in all the regressions (explaining sorting measures D, GC and
T for income, age and education).40
39The coeﬃcient estimate is larger, in absolute value, than the one obtained from our baseline regression
with the original sample of 242 MSAs. It is also larger than the coeﬃcient estimate obtained from the
baseline regression with 208 MSAs.
40Intuitively, the part of house price volatility, which is orthogonal to WRLURI (the strictness of
regulation), can be thought of as measuring the size of regional shocks (ε). We know that house price
31Arguably, the characteristics of the built environment also aﬀect the pattern of resi-
dential sorting (cf. Nechyba (2000)). If, say, the housing stock is very diﬀerent in diﬀerent
parts of a MSA, one expects that the degree of sorting in the MSA should be relatively
high, ceteris paribus. To control for these eﬀects, we construct Theil indices for two as-
pects of the housing stock, the age of housing units, THoAge, and the number of housing
units in a residential building41, THoUnit. The interpretation of these Theil indices is as
above: the larger the value of THoAge (or THoUnit) ,t h em o r et h eM C D sw i t h i nt h eM S A
diﬀer from each other. When we add THoAge and THoUnit to our baseline regressions (Ta-
ble 3), the coeﬃcients of these indices are of the expected sign, i.e. positive, but only
THoAge is statistically signiﬁcant, while THoUnit is not signiﬁcant in any of the regressions.
Importantly, the coeﬃcient estimate of house price volatility still remains negative, and
it is statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level in eight of our nine regressions (the
expectation is the case, where the dependent variable is GCIncome). If we drop THoUnit,
the coeﬃcient of price volatility is almost42 signiﬁcant at the 5% level in all of the regres-
sions (and if we further include the regulatory index WRLURI, the word “almost” can be
dropped).
Finally, we add the share of rental housing to the set of control variables. A large rental
sector in a MSA is associated with a higher degree of sorting in terms of age and education.
However, the extent of income sorting is negatively correlated with the share of rental
housing. This may reﬂect the presence of rent control in a number of metropolitan housing
markets: under rent control, the allocation of housing is not determined by the willingness
to pay, but by some other mechanisms, such as queueing (cf. Glaeser and Luttmer (2003)).
When we augment our baseline regression with the share of rental housing, the coeﬃcient
estimate of house price volatility is still negative, and it is statistically signiﬁcant at least
at the 5% level.
ﬂuctuations tend to be larger in highly regulated MSAs, where housing supply is inelastic, than in lightly
regulated MSAs ,where supply is more elastic. Then if housing construction is lightly regulated in a MSA,
but nevertheless the MSA has experienced sizeable house price ﬂuctuations, it is reasonable to assume
that the MSA has been buﬀeted by large shocks. Our model predicts that under these circumstances,
the degree of residential sorting should be low.
41This measure essentially tells whether there are detached houses, semi-detached houses or blocks of
ﬂats in an area.
42The t-statistic is just below the critical value 1.96, when the dependent variable is GCIncome or DAge.
32We turn to comparing residential sorting of movers to that of stayers across (so called)
Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) in the whole US.43 This part is related to the work
by Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2008), who study income distributions among movers and
stayers. According to Proposition 6, movers should be more sorted than stayers. That is,
if two mobile households choose the same jurisdiction, these newcomers typically share
some common characteristics; they also tend to diﬀer from other mobile households, which
choose a diﬀerent location. By contrast, stayers living within the same jurisdiction tend
to have less in common with each other.
To investigate the above predictions, we classify an individual as a mover, if (s)he
has resided in his/her current home for less than ﬁve years; otherwise the individual is a
stayer. Then, for each characteristic (age, education, income) and each group (movers and
stayers), we compute the Theil’s information theory index across PUMAs in the whole
US. Thus, N in (21) now stands for the US population, Ni is the population of PUMA i,
Sm is the share of group m in the US, and Smi is the share of group m in PUMA i.T h e
PUMA data allows us to compute separate indices for owner-occupying households and
households that live in rental housing.
The results for owner-occupying movers and stayers are reported in the ﬁrst two
columns of Table 4. Clearly, the degree of sorting is lower among stayers than movers.
Based on our theory, we interpret the low degree of sorting among owner-occupying stayers
as reﬂecting housing market related wealth shocks. Some households, which would like to
move out of an area where property prices fall, may be unable to do so because they have
negative equity. Alternatively, some stayers, who bought their home when prices were
lower, may be unwilling to leave when the area becomes more expensive. If this wealth
shock based mechanism were (a part of) the explanation, one expects that among renters
(who do not face wealth shocks in the housing market) the pattern of sorting should be
diﬀerent. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that among renters, stayers are more sorted than movers;
s e et h et h i r da n df o u r t hc o l u m n so fT a b l e4 . Finally, the last two columns show that
results on all movers and stayers are qualitatively similar to those of owner-occupiers.
43Each PUMA has a population of approximately 100 000. For further information, see the appendix.
33As an additional piece of evidence, we compare “short distance movers”, i.e. house-
holds which have moved within the same metropolitan area, and “long distance movers”,
i.e. households, which have moved from another metropolitan area.44 Because “long dis-
tance movers” have more likely moved between two uncorrelated markets (so that the
prices of the old and the new home may have evolved very diﬀerently), they should be
more sorted than “short distance movers”. The Theil information theory indices reported
in Table 5 indicate that among owner-occupiers “long distance movers” are indeed more
sorted than “short distance movers”, according to all three criteria.
Finally, if movers are more sorted than stayers, we expect that educational attainment,
age and income are more dispersed across regions among movers than among stayers.
Table 6 reports standard deviations over PUMA regions of the share of home-owners
with a high school degree and the share of home-owners with at least a college degree,
separately for movers and stayers. Clearly, both of the shares vary more across regions
among movers than among stayers; and these diﬀerences are also statistically signiﬁcant,
as shown by the p-values of the Levene (1960) and the Brown-Forsythe (1974) tests for
equal variance. Furthermore, Table 6 shows that owner-occupying movers’ age and income
vary more across PUMA areas than those of stayers. As a robustness check, Table 6 also
makes the same comparisons for people that live in rental housing. Because renters do
not face similar housing market related wealth shocks as owners, moving renters need not
be more sorted than staying renters. Consistent with this, the results of Table 6 indicate
that moving renters are, in the most part, no more sorted than staying renters (and, in
fact, the reverse can also be true).
6 Conclusions
When a household buys a home in a certain location, the choice it makes has major
implications for the composition of its wealth portfolio. If the household buys an expensive
home, it has less net wealth left to allocate to other assets. Also, regional house prices
44We also use data on people that have moved from or to a non-MSA region. See the appendix for
more details.
34ﬂuctuate over time, and as investments, diﬀerent houses and locations oﬀer diﬀerent
prospects. The success of today’s investment will, in part, determine what kind of home
the household will be able to buy in the future.
This paper examined how the asset aspect of housing aﬀects the socioeconomic make-
up of local jurisdictions. Our theoretical analysis suggests that a strong investment motive
gives rise to internally homogeneous jurisdictions, where neighbors resemble each other. If
expected resale value plays a major role in location choice, in equilibrium those households
with the highest current utility premium will live in the most desirable and expensive
locations, while households with a lower premium will choose locations which are currently
less expensive but where property values may rise.
Even if expected resale value is not an important criterion in location choice, the
asset aspect of housing still matters. When households rank locations based on current
beneﬁts, in equilibrium wealth determines who lives where. Typically a household resides
in an unpopular location if and only if it is borrowing constrained and cannot aﬀord a
more expensive home. Since current wealth depends, in part, on past luck in the housing
market, households residing within the same area may then have little in common, except
for the value of their home.
To sum up, there is an inverse relation between the importance of investment consid-
erations at the household level, and the importance of the wealth aspect of housing at
the aggregate level. The less the households see the home as an investment, the more
the asset aspect of housing moulds the socioeconomic make-up of jurisdictions and the
pattern of sorting.
Empirically, the model predicts that the size of house price ﬂuctuations should be
negatively correlated with the degree of residential sorting. To examine this hypothesis,
we computed measures of residential sorting for income, age and education. In a sample
of US metropolitan areas, we documented a negative relationship between the degree of
sorting and the size of house price ﬂuctuations.
35Theory Appendix
Location choice
The household’s decision problem boils down to the choice of the sequence of optimal
thresholds θ
∗
n.S i n c exn ≡ G(θ
∗
n) is a monotonous function of θ
∗
n,a l s oxn can be treated
as a choice variable. Using the threshold rule (8) and integrating (5) over all θ shows that
the household’s decision problem can be summarized by the Bellman equation45
V (n)=m a x
xn
u(xn)+β {(1 − π)V (n)+π[xnV (n +1 )+( 1− xn)V (n − 1)]}, (22)












is the expected utility stream at wealth level n.N o t i c e t h a t
d2u(xn)
dx2
n = − 1
G0(θ∗
n) < 0.
Thus (22) deﬁnes a maximization problem with a concave objective function and linear
constraints. As a consequence the value function V (n) is concave.
We also show that limn→∞θ
∗
n = −ε.I f n o t , t h e n l i m n→∞θ
∗
n = b θ
∗
> −ε.S i n c e
θ
∗
n is a non-increasing sequence, and, by assumption, the feasible values of θ
∗

















=0for all ﬁnite, positive
integers k ≥ 1. But then limn→∞ (un+k − un)=0for all k ≥ 1. As a consequence,
limn→∞ [V (n +1 )− V (n − 1)] = 0,a n dlimn→∞ θ
∗
n = −ε. A contradiction.
Next, let v(n) ≡ V (n +1 )− V (n − 1) and ∆xn ≡ xn+1 − xn−1; since θ
∗
n is a non-
increasing sequence, ∆xn ∈ [−1,0].A l s od e ﬁne the operator L
L[z (n)] ≡ (1 − π)z (n)+π[xn+1z (n +1 )+( 1− xn−1)z (n − 1)],
where z (n) is a generic function of n.S i n c eV (n) satisﬁes the recursive equation (22),
45Diﬀerentiating (22) with respect to xn shows that the optimal thresholds are characterized by (7).





−1 (x)dx − ∆xnε + βL[v(n)]. (23)
Finally, the expression for θ
∗
n, eq. (7), can be rewritten as
θ
∗
n = Q(n;ε,π) ≡− ε + πβv(n) for n ≥ 1.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 (i) Deﬁne qε (n) ≡
dv(n)
dε .D i ﬀerentiating (23) with respect to
ε yields qε (n)=−∆xn + βL[qε (n)]. (Notice that indirect eﬀects can be ignored due
to the envelope theorem.) Let qε
max ≡ maxqε (n) and nε ≡ argmaxqε (n).N o w qε
max ≤
−∆xnε+βqε














(ii) Deﬁne qπ (n)=
d[πv(n)]
dπ . Then multiplying both sides of (23) by π, diﬀerentiating
the resulting equation by π, and simplifying, yields qπ (n)=( 1− β)v(n)+βL[qπ (n)].L e t
qπ
min ≡ minq(n) and nπ ≡ argminq(n).N o wqπ
min ≥ (1 − β)v(nπ)+βqπ











dπ = βqπ (n) ≥ βqπ
min > 0.
Stationary wealth distribution
In what follows we derive equations (9) and (10).
If there is a regional shock, all f (n) households which were previously in wealth class n
either go up to n+1or fall to n−1, depending on their house location. They are replaced
by f0
n−1 (n − 1) class n−1 households which have made a capital gain and f1
n (n +1 )class
n+1households which have suﬀered a capital loss. The wealth distribution is stationary
if and only if






n−1 (n − 1) + f
1
n (n +1 ) (24)
for all n. We also consider the model version, with a continuum of atomistic regions.
Between any periods, a measure π of the locations is hit by a regional shock, and the
37wealth distribution is stationary if and only if




n−1 (n − 1) + f
1
n (n +1 )
¢
. (25)
It is easy to conclude that (25) reduces to (24): as a consequence, both model variants
have the same long-run wealth distribution and the same long-run equilibrium.
There are no wealth classes below 0 (i.e., f (n)=0for n<0)a n da tw e a l t hl e v e l0 the
households can only choose an unpopular location (i.e., f1
−1 (0) = 0). These restrictions




n)f (n) and f1
n−1 (n)=( 1− G(θ
∗
n))f (n) into (9) yields the sequence (10).
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) We begin by deriving equation (14), which is needed in the proof of the proposition.
Using vector notation, equation (22) can be rewritten as follows
V =m a x
{xn}
u + β [(1 − π)I + πA]V (26)
for n ≥ 1 (and x0 =1 )where V is the (ex ante) value function, stacked as a column
vector, u is a column vector with elements un = u(xn), and A is a transition matrix,
with elements Ai,j =1− xi if j = i − 1,A i,j = xi if j = i +1and Ai,j =0otherwise.
Premultiplying both sides of (26) by the stationary wealth distribution f0 yields f0V =
f0u+f0β [(1 − π)I + πA]V. The distribution f is induced by the transition matrix A, and

































E [θ | h =1 ],







E [θ | h =1 ]
1 − β
. (28)
(ii) As proving the proposition with respect to π and ε involves the same steps, we
introduce a generic parameter ρ, where ρ ∈ {π,ε}.A l s o ,l e tx be the vector with the nth
































Equality (a) involves a decomposition into the direct eﬀect and the indirect eﬀect. (b)
follows from the fact that w does not depend directly on π and ε (see (27)), and thus
∂w
∂ρ =0 .( c) follows from equality (28). (d)u s e st h ed e ﬁnition of W, (13), and the envelope
theorem: since the threshold θ
∗
n, and thus also xn, is optimally chosen in all wealth classes
n ≥ 1,as m a l lp o l i c yc h a n g ed o e sn o ta ﬀect the value function V (n).
By Lemma 2 we know that the wealth distribution shifts to the right, in the sense of
ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, when π increases or ε decreases. As the value function


















Proof of Proposition 4
(a) Match dimension. When ε → 0, the basic allocation problem vanishes, and the
result is obvious. Next consider the case δ → 1. The household chooses {xn},s o
as to maximize the value function V, where V satisﬁes the recursive equation V =
δAV +( 1− δ) u
1−β. (This equation follows directly from (26).) Iterating forward, we get




1−β. Next notice that limt→∞At = 1⊗f0 (where ⊗ is Kronecker
product). Thus when π → 1 and β → 1, so that δ → 1, maximizing V becomes es-
sentially equivalent to maximizing f0u = w = 1
2E [θ | h =1 ] . The objective function
39w = 1
2E [θ | h =1 ]is maximized iﬀ there is perfect sorting in the match dimension.
(b) Sorting in the wealth dimension. The putative equilibrium strategy is of the
following form: h(0,θ)=0for all θ (due to the borrowing constraint), h(n,θ)=1for all
θ and n ≥ 1. Then in equilibrium f (0) = f (1) = 1
2 and f (n)=0for all n ≥ 2.
Given this strategy, it is easy to calculate the ex ante values of the program V (n)
at diﬀerent wealth levels n ≥ 0. In particular, one can show that V (2) − V (0) =
(1 − δ)
ε+E[θ]
1−β . Given the optimal location choice rule (6), the putative strategy is optimal
for the household iﬀ it always prefers the desirable location at wealth level n =1 , i.e., iﬀ
θ + ε>π β[V (2) − V (0)] = πβ(1 − δ)
ε + E [θ]
1 − β
for all θ. (29)
In particular, the condition (29) must hold for the lowest possible realization of the match
θL. Inserting θ = θL, and slightly manipulating (29), yields the condition for residential
sorting in the wealth dimension: θL + ε>π β
E[θ]−θL
1−β .
Proof of Proposition 6
(a)W ed e ﬁne cumulative distribution functions G(θ | h,m) separately for four groups,
conditioning on the households present location (h ∈ {0,1}), and on whether the house-
hold has moved in the present period (m =1 , if the household has moved, and m =0 ,
if the household has not moved). So, for example, G(θ | h =0 ,m=1 )is the distribu-
tion function for those households, which moved at the beginning of the period (from an
expensive location) and currently live in a cheap location. We also deﬁne the functions
DG(θ | h) ≡ G(θ | h,m =1 )− G(θ | h,m =0 ),h ∈ {0,1} (30)
which allow us to compare (in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance) the distrib-
utions of newcomers and old residents, who live in the same location (0 or 1).
To prove the proposition, we need to construct G(θ | h,m), h,m ∈ {0,1}.
(i) As a ﬁrst step, we characterize the match distributions of households living in the
desirable and in the undesirable location, conditional on wealth class n. Given the thresh-
40o l dl o c a t i o nc h o i c er u l e( 8 ) ,t h ed i s t r i b u t i o ni nt h ed e s i r a b l el o c a t i o nG(θ | h =1 ,n)=






n) for θ ≥ θ
∗
n (and 0 for θ<θ
∗
n) is left-truncated, with trun-
cation point θ
∗






n) for θ ≤ θ
∗
n (and 1 for θ>θ
∗
n) is right-truncated with the same
truncation point θ
∗








n ≤ 0 for all θ.





n2, the higher threshold θ
∗
n1 in group n1 implies that the distri-
bution G(θ | h,n1) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the distribution G(θ | h,n2) for
h ∈ {0,1}. More formally
G(θ | h,n1) ≤ G(θ | h,n2) for all θ, when n1 <n 2 and h ∈ {0,1}. (31)
(ii) As a second step, we need to study the conditional wealth distributions, contingent
on housing location and mobility. The main objective is to establish a ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance relation between movers and stayers in each location.
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m(i) be the relative share of wealth class n in group (h,m).
Next, to compare the wealth distributions, we need the size ratios of adjacent wealth
classes in diﬀerent groups. Denote b γ
h
m(n) ≡ b ϕ
h



















































¢ ≥ 1 (34)



































≥ 1. The inequality (33) allows us to com-
pare the wealth distributions of mover and stayer households, which currently reside in
the cheap location. The inequality tells that, for any adjacent wealth classes (n +1 )
and n,t h er a t i ob ϕ
0
m (n +1 )/b ϕ
0
m(n) is larger for movers than for stayers. But this means
that in the cheap location newcomers are wealthier than the old residents, in the sense of
ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. The inequality (34) then implies that in the expensive
location the opposite is true, and old residents are wealthier than newcomers, in the sense
of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance.
(iii) As a ﬁnal step, we combine the results of steps (i) and (ii), and construct the






m (n)G(θ | h,n), for h,m ∈ {0,1}. (35)
That is, the conditional match distributions G(θ | h,m) are convex combinations of the
location-contingent distributions G(θ | h,n) at diﬀerent wealth levels n.I n e a c h g r o u p
(h,m), the weight assigned to the distribution function G(θ | h,n) corresponds to the
relative size of wealth class n in the group, b ϕ
h
m (n).
Using (30) and (35), we get










G(θ | h =0 ,n) ≥ 0,










G(θ | h =1 ,n) ≤ 0
(36)
for all θ. The inequalities follow from stochastic dominance, results (31), (33) and (34).
The expressions (36) mean that in a currently cheap location, the match distribution of
old residents stochastically dominates the match distribution of newcomers, while the in
a currently expensive location the opposite is true. Thus we have proved that in both
areas movers (with m =1 ) tend to have a better match with the location than stayers
(m =0 ) .
(b) To address the degree of residential sorting among movers and stayers, we further
deﬁne DG(θ | m) ≡ G(θ | h =1 ,m)−G(θ | h =0 ,m),m∈ {0,1}. Then DG(θ | m =1 )
tells how the distribution of households which have moved from a cheap location to an
42expensive location diﬀers from the distribution of those households which have moved the
other way round; also DG(θ | m =0 )allows us to compare the distributions of immobile
households living in diﬀerent locations. Finally, to compare the degree of residential
sorting between movers and stayer, we deﬁne the function RSm/s (θ) ≡ DG(θ | m =1 )−
DG(θ | m =0 ) . It is clear than both among movers and among stayers, those who live in
the desirable location typically have a higher value of θ than those who reside in the less
desirable location, that is DG(θ | m) ≤ 0 for all θ and for m ∈ {0,1}.N o ww eu s et h e
function RSm/s (θ) to address the question: among which group (movers or stayers) are
the households residing in diﬀerent locations more distinct from each other. In particular,
if RSm/s (θ) ≤ 0 for all θ, movers are more sorted in this sense. But
RSm/s (θ)=DG(θ | m =1 )− DG(θ | m =0 )
= G(θ | h =1 ,m=1 )− G(θ | h =0 ,m=1 )
−[G(θ | h =1 ,m=0 )− G(θ | h =0 ,m=0 ) ]
= DG(θ | h =1 )− DG(θ | h =0 )≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from (36).
More general match dynamics
Let v(θ,n) ≡ V (θ,n+1 )− V (θ,n− 1) and ∆h(θ,n) ≡ h(θ,n+1 )− h(θ,n− 1).A l s o
deﬁne the operator b L,





















where z (θ,n) is a generic function of θ and n.S i n c eV (θ,n) satisﬁes the Bellman equation
(17), the function v(θ,n) satisﬁes the recursive equation
v(θ,n)=∆h(θ,n)(ε + θ)+βb L[v(θ,n)]. (37)
43For all θ and all n ≥ 1, the household’s location choice rule assumes the form h(θ,n)=1iﬀ









Lemma 1’ For all θ and n ≥ 1, (i)
d e Q(θ,n;ε,σ)
dε < 0 and (ii)
de Q(θ,n;ε,σ)
dσ > 0.
Proof (i) Deﬁne b qε (θ,n) ≡
dv(θ,n)
dε .D i ﬀerentiating (37) with respect to ε shows that
b qε (θ,n) satisﬁes the equation b qε (θ,n)=∆h(θ,n)+βb L[b qε (θ,n)].N e x td e ﬁne b qε
max ≡






























,e nε)) ≤ 1
1−β(1−π). Finally,
de Q(θ,n;ε,σ)












1−β(1−π) < 0.( i i )D e ﬁne b qσ (θ,n) ≡
d[σv(θ,n)]
dσ . Multiplying both sides of
(37) by σ, diﬀerentiating with respect to σ, and simplifying, shows that b qσ (θ,n) satisﬁes
the equation b qσ (θ,n)=( 1− β)v(θ,n)+βb L[b qσ (θ,n)].N e x td e ﬁne b qσ






≡ argmin b qσ (θ,n).T h e nb qσ



























1−β(1−π) > 0. Finally,
d e Q(θ,n;ε,σ)











Stationary distribution. Let b fn (θj) denote the long-run frequency mass of house-
holds with match θj and wealth n,a n dl e tb fn be a J × 1 vector, with the jth element
b fn (θj). Also let Hn,n≥ 1, be a J × J diagonal matrix, with the jth diagonal element
h(θj,n) (and all oﬀ-diagonal elements equal to 0), and let Bn = I − Hn. The stationary
distribution satisﬁes the following set of recursive equations
b f
0
n =( 1− σ) b f
0











for all n =0 ,1,... Simplifying yields
b f
0











Notice in particular that the parameters ε and σ do not appear in (38), and thus the
joint distribution of wealth and the match depends on these parameters only indirectly,
through changes in policies.
Equilibrium. Postmultiplying both sides of equation (38) by the unit vector 1,a n d
taking into account the fact that Λ01 =Λ11 = 1, yields a set of recursive equations for
44the marginal distribution of wealth
f (n)=f
0
n−1 (n − 1) + f
1
n (n +1 ) (39)
where f (n)=b f0
n1 is the frequency mass of households at wealth level n, f0
n (n)=b f0
nBn1 is
the mass of households at wealth level n residing in an unpopular location, and f1
n−1 (n)=
b f0
nHn1 is the mass of households at wealth level n residing in a popular location. But
equation (39) is identical to equation (24) so that equilibrium follows in the same way as
in Section 2.5.
Lemma 2’ Deﬁne the cumulative distribution function b F (θj,n;ε,σ)=
Pn
i=0 b fi (θj).
Then
de F(θj,n;ε,σ)
dε ≥ 0 and
de F(θj,n;ε,σ)
dσ ≤ 0 for all n and θj.
Proof Deﬁne a history as a collection of match realizations and regional shock realizations
Ht = {(θτ,s τ)}t
τ=0. Notice that histories are exogenous in the sense that they do not
depend on the households’ location choices. Denote a state by y =( θ,n).C o n s i d e rt w o
location choice rules h0 and h1 such that for some state b y, h0(b y)=0and h1(b y)=1 ,a n d
f o ra l lo t h e rs t a t e sy 6= b y, h0(y)=h1(y)=h(y) (where h(y) is the common policy).
Next notice that there is a mapping from histories Ht to states yt, conditional on
policy hi,i∈ {0,1} (and initial state). That is, at any date t, the household’s wealth
ni
t = ni (Ht) and the state yi
t = yi (Ht),w h e r ei ∈ {0,1} refers to the policy that the
household follows.
Consider two households. Household 0 follows policy h0, while household 1 follows
policy h1. Assume the households have the same history Ht.D e ﬁne νt ≡ n0
t − n1
t and










t)) ∈ {−2,0,2}. (40)
Assume that for some period t, νt =0so that also y0
t = y1
t. Given the properties of h0
and h1 it is evident that
∆νt ∈ {0,2}, if νt =0 . (41)
(∆νt =2iﬀ y0
t = y1
t = b y and st+1 =1 ). Next, assume the households have the same
45initial wealth, ν0 =0 . From (40) and (41) it follows that νt =2 k, k ∈ {0,1,2,...} for
all t =0 ,1,2,... The essential ﬁnding is that, given identical histories and equal initial
wealth, household 1 cannot be wealthier than household 0.
Assume that there is a population of households following policy h0, and another
population following policy h1. Also assume that all households, in either population, have
the same initial wealth. As above, we refer to a household belonging to population 0 (1)
as household 0 (1). Now, the proof of the lemma derives from the following observations.
(i) After any given (common) history Ht, household 0 is at least as wealthy as household
1. (ii) After any given (common) history Ht,h o u s e h o l d0 and household 1 have the same
match. (iii) The probability distribution over the histories does not depend on policy. (iv)
In any period t, and for any given current match, the wealth distribution under policy h0
stochastically dominates the wealth distribution under policy h1.( v )W h e nt →∞ ,t h e
joint distribution of wealth and the match converges to the stationary distribution. Thus
stochastic dominance applies to the stationary distribution. Finally, Lemma 1’ implies
that when ε increases or σ decreases, the households may shift from policy h0 to policy
h1, but the opposite shift (from policy h1 to policy h0) never happens.
Proposition 2’ When ε decreases or σ increases, social welfare grows.
Proof L e tu sd e ﬁne a KJ state Markov chain y, where the (nJ + j)th state is given by
the pair (θj,n).N o t i c e t h a t K (the number of wealth levels) is n +1 ,i fθL > −ε, and
otherwise K = ∞.L e t h be a KJ × 1 vector, with the (nJ + j)th element h(θj,n).
Further deﬁne a KJ × KJ diagonal matrix H, with the vector h on the diagonal (and
all oﬀ-diagonal elements equal to zero), and let the KJ ×KJ matrix b A be the transition
matrix of the Markov chain y.
The value function can be presented as a KJ × 1 vector b V ,w h e r et h e(nJ + j)th
element is the value of the household’s program in state (θj,n). b V satisﬁes the Bellman
equation









(1 − σ)I + σ b A
i
b V, (42)
where θ is the J ×1 vector of types θj. The stationary distribution of y is a KJ×1 vector
b f. The distribution is induced by the transition matrix b A and it satisﬁes the equation






b fn (θj)h(θj,n)θj = b f
0H (1K ⊗ θ)=
1
2






b fn (θj)V (θj,n)=b f
0b V
Next we premultiply both sides of (42) by b f0. Then using the fact that b f0 = b f0 b A,a n d




=0 , by the housing market equilibrium, yields
c W = b w + βc W ⇔ c W = b w/(1 − β). (43)
Given the equation (43), and Lemma 2’, Proposition 2’ can be proved following the same
steps as in the proof of Proposition 2. See part (ii) of the proof.
Proposition 3’ When ε increases or σ decreases, the degree of residential sorting in the
match dimension decreases in the sense explained in Proposition 3.
Proof The result follows from Proposition 2’. See the proof of Proposition 3.
Corollary 1’ There is a negative relation between the size of house price ﬂuctuations
and the degree of residential sorting in the match dimension.
Proposition 4’ When ε increases or σ decreases, the degree of residential sorting in the
wealth dimension increases in the sense explained in Proposition 4.
Proof The results follows from Lemma 2’. See the proof of Proposition 4.
Data Appendix
Description of variables of Tables 2 and 3
Except the price variation measure (see footnote 37), the applied variables in Tables 2
and 3 are computed from extraction of data from the 1990 decennial Census, published in
the ICPSR study 2889 (1990). The tables apply the data set 2 (DS2) where each variable
is aggregated to the municipality (MCD) level. The ﬁnal samples of observations cover
47all MSAs for which we have house price data.
The sorting measures applied in Tables 2 and 3 are based on the following groups of
types. We use ﬁve categories for age: (1) “children” (those of 0-15 years old), (2) “youth”
(16-24 years old), (3) “adults, early career” (25-44 years old), (4) “adults, late career”
(45-64 years old), and (5) “seniors” (those at least 65 years old). For education, we have
three groups: (1) less than a high school degree, (2) at least a high school degree but not a
college degree, and (3) a college degree or more. The Census deﬁnes the education groups
for only those who are at least 25 years old. This age category is used to normalize the
education groups within each region. Finally, for income we apply all the 25 income groups
available in the ICPSR study 2889. The education and income categories applied here
are similar to those of the dissimilarity indices and Gini coeﬃcients considered by Rhode
and Strumpf (2003, p. 1660) (see also their Data Appendix at www.unc.edu/~cigar/ or
www.unc.edu/~prhode/).
To compute the control variables of Table 3 we use the following original variables of
the data set (see ICPSR study 2889 (1990)): “v9” for “Number of municipalities”; “v103”
and “v9” for “Average size of municipalities”; “v103” and “v121” for “Population density
in MSA”; “v103” and “v121” for “Land area of MSA”; “v103” for “Number of Families in
MSA.” Among the additional control variables discussed in the text: the diversity measure
of the age of housing units (“THoAge”) assumes three classes: houses build (1) “at most
5 years ago”, (2) “6-10 years ago”, and (3) “at least 11 years ago”. The corresponding
measure for the number of housing units in a residential building (“THoUnit”) is computed
based on three classes: (1) “1-unit structures”, (2) “2-4 unit structures” and (3) “5 or
more unit structures”. We apply “v1804” and “v1801” to compute the share of people
that live in rental housing. Finally, the regulation variable (“WRLURI”) is obtained from
http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~gyourko/Wharton_residential_land_use_reg.htm, while
the variable “UNDEV” is obtained from Saiz (2008, Table 1).
48Description of sorting measures of Tables 4, 5 and 6
The data applied in Tables 4, 5 and 6 are from the Census data provided at www.ipums.org.
The web site provides detailed deﬁnitions for each variable in the data. For each obser-
vation unit (i.e., person) in the 1% sample from the 1990 Census, we downloaded house-
hold id (SERIAL), age (AGE), educational attainment (EDUC99), household income
(FTOTINC), tenure (OWNERSHP), migration information (MIGRATE5, MIGMET5,
MIGPLAC5) and location indicators (PUMA, STATEFIP, METAREA). These data in-
clude observations on 2,479,568 persons from 1760 diﬀerent PUMAs. The actual number
of people in each PUMA is also obtained from www.ipums.org.
To compute the Theil information theory indices in Table 4, we classify each sample
p e r s o ni n t oam o v e r( M I G R A T E 5=2 ) or a stayer (MIGRATE5 =1 ). Furthermore, we
classify a person as an owner, if OWNERSHP =1 0and a renter, if OWNERSHP =2 0 .
Persons with missing observations on MIGRATE5 or OWNERSHP are excluded from the
calculations. We apply similar categories as in Tables 2 and 3. For age, we estimate the
shares of “children”, “youth”, etc. in each PUMA by computing the relative shares of the
sample persons belonging to the relevant age category (for “children” the share of those
0-15 years old, etc.). For education, we restrict the sample to those at least 25 years old.
The three education groups (consistent with those in Tables 2 and 3) are formed by (1)
EDUC99 ≤ 9, (2) 10 ≤ EDUC99 ≤ 11, and (3) 12 ≤ EDUC99. Finally, to compute the
index for income, we ﬁrst restrict the sample to household heads only (SERIAL =1 ).
Then we employ FTOTINC to classify each household into one of the 25 income ranges
used in the ICPSR data, and compute the corresponding relative shares in each PUMA.
In all cases (age, education and income), the US level shares are obtained as a population
weighted average of the PUMA shares.
To compute the Theil information theory indices in Table 5, we ﬁr s tr e s t r i c tt h es a m p l e
into persons that are owner-occupiers (OWNERSHP =1 0 ) and have moved recently
(MIGRATE5 =2 ). Within this subsample, we classify a person as a “short distance
mover”, if his current MSA is the same as ﬁve years ago, i.e., if METAREA and MIGMET5
match; otherwise the person is classiﬁed as a “long distance mover”. In addition to data
49on persons that have moved from one MSA region to another, we also use data on persons
that have moved from or to a non-MSA region. If a person has moved from an MSA region
to a non-MSA region, or vice versa, he or she is recorded as a “long distance mover”, while
a person that has moved between two non-MSA regions is recorded as a “long distance
mover” only, if his or her current state of residence (STATEFIP) is diﬀerent from that
ﬁve years ago (MIGPLAC5). The indices are formed by applying the same convention of
groupings as in Table 4.
The PUMA observations of the variables considered in Table 6 are computed for house-
hold heads only, while the applied groupings (“Owners”, “Renters”, “Movers”, “Stayers”)
are deﬁned in the same way as in Table 4. “High school degree, %” is the relative share
of household heads at least 25 years old that have 10 ≤ EDUC99 ≤ 11, “College degree,
%” is the corresponding share of those that have 12 ≤ EDUC99 ≤ 17. Finally, “Age” and
“Income”, respectively, refer to the average age (AGE) and income (FTOTINC) over the
relevant households in each case.
References
Abraham, J., and P. Hendershott (1996), “Bubbles in metropolitan housing markets,”
Journal of Housing Research, 7, 191—207.
Aiyagari, S. R. (1994) “Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 109, 659—684.
Alexander, C., and M. Barrow (1994) “Seasonality and cointegration of regional house
prices in the UK,” Urban Studies, 31, 1667—1689.
Ashworth, J., and S. Parker (1997) “Modelling regional house prices in the UK,” Scottish
Journal of Political Economy, 44, 225—246.
Banks, J., R. Blundell, and J. P. Smith (2002) “Wealth portfolios in the UK and the US,”
NBER Working Paper 9128.
50Bénabou, R. (1996) “Equity and eﬃciency in human capital investment: the local con-
nection,” Review of Economic Studies, 63, 237—264.
Brown, M. B., and A. B. Forsythe (1974) “Robust tests for the equality of variances,”
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 69, 364—367.
Brueckner, J. K. (1997) “Consumption and investment motives and the portfolio choices
of homeowners,” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 15, 159—180.
Capozza, D. P., M. C. Hendershott, and C. Mayer (2004) “An anatomy of price dynam-
ics in illiquid markets: Analysis and evidence from local housing markets,” Real Estate
Economics, 32, 1—32.
Case, K. E., and C. J. Mayer (1996) “Housing price dynamics within a metropolitan
area,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 26, 387—407.
Case, K. E., and R. J. Shiller (1989) “The eﬃciency of the market for single-family homes,”
American Economic Review, 79, 125—137.
Chan, S. (1996) “Residential mobility and mortgages,” Regional Science and Urban Eco-
nomics, 26, 287—311.
–– (2001) “Spatial lock-in: Do falling house prices constrain residential mobility?,”
Journal of Urban Economics, 49, 567—586.
Cocco, J (2005) “Portfolio choice in the presence of housing,” Review of Financial Studies,
18, 535—567.
Cook, S. (2003) “The convergence of regional house prices in the UK,” Urban Studies,4 0 ,
2285—2294.
Davidoﬀ, T. (2005) “Income sorting: Measurement and decomposition,” Journal of Urban
Economics, 58, 289—303.
Del Negro, M., and C. Otrok (2007) “99 Luftballons: Monetary policy and the house price
boom across U.S. states,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 35, 1—27.
51DiPasquale, D., and W. Wheaton (1994) “Housing market dynamics and the future of
house prices,” Journal of Urban Economics, 35, 1—27.
Ellickson, B. (1971) “Jurisdictional fragmentation and residential choice,” Papers and
Proceeding of the American Economic Association, 61, 334—339.
Eberts, R. W., and T. J., Gronberg. (1981) “Jurisdictional homogeneity and the Tiebout
hypothesis,” Journal of Urban Economics, 10, 227—239.
Epple, D., R. Filimon, and T. Romer (1984) “Equilibrium among local jurisdictions:
Toward an integrated treatment of voting and residential choice,” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 24, 281—308.
Epple, D., and G. J., Platt. (1998) “Equilibrium and local redistribution in an urban
economy when households diﬀer by preferences and income,” Journal of Urban Economics,
43, 23—51.
Epple, D., and T. Romer (1989) “On ﬂexible municipal boundaries,” Journal of Urban
Economics, 26, 307—319.
–– (1991) “Mobility and redistribution,” Journal of Political Economy, 99, 828—859.
Epple, D., T. Romer, and H. Sieg (2001) “Interjurisdictional sorting and majority rule:
An empirical analysis,” Econometrica, 69, 1437—1465.
Epple, D., and H. Sieg (1999) “Estimating equilibrium models of local jurisdictions,”
Journal of Political Economy, 107, 645—681.
Evenson, B. (2003) “Understanding house price volatility: Measuring and explaining
the supply side of metropolitan area housing markets,” MIT Department of Economics
Working Paper, April 2003.
Fernandez, R., and R. Rogerson (1996) “Income distribution, communities, and the qual-
ity of public education,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 135—164.
52Ferreira, F., J. Gyourko, and J. Tracy (2008) “Housing busts and household mobility,”
NBER Working Paper 14310.
Flavin, M., and T. Yamashita (2002) “Owner-occupied housing and the composition of
the household portfolios,” American Economic Review, 92, 345—362.
Glaeser, E., and J. Gyourko (2005) “Urban decline and durable housing,” Journal of
Political Economy, 113, 345—375.
–– (2007) “Housing dynamics,” Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion
Paper 2137.
Gyourko, J, A. Saiz, and A. A. Summers (2008) “A New Measure of the Local Regula-
tory Environment for Housing Markets: The Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory
Index,” Urban Studies, 45, 693—729.
Henderson, J. V. (1991) “Separating Tiebout equilibrium,” Journal of Urban Economics,
29, 128—152,
Henderson, J. V., and Y. M Ioannides (1983) “A model of housing tenure choice,” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 73, 98—113.
–– (1987) “Owner occupancy: Investment vs consumption demand,” Journal of Urban
Economics, 21, 228—241.
Henley, A. (1998) “Residential mobility, housing equity and the labour market,” Economic
Journal, 108, 414—427.
Himmelberg, C., C. Mayer, and T. Sinai (2005) “Assessing high house prices: Bubbles,
fundamentals and misperceptions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 67—92.
Hoxby, C. M. (2000) “Does competition among public schools beneﬁt students and tax-
payers?,” American Economic Review, 90, 1209—1238.
Huggett, M. (1993) “The risk free rate in heterogeneous-agent, incomplete-insurance
economies,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 17, 953—969.
53Iacoviello, M., and F. Ortalo-Magné (2003) “Hedging housing risk in London,” Journal
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 27, 191—209.
Ioannides, Y. (2004) “Neighborhood income distributions,” Journal of Urban Economics,
56, 435—457.
Ioannides, Y. M., and T. N. Seslen (2002) “Neighborhood wealth distributions,” Eco-
nomics Letters, 76, 357—367.
Lamont, O., and J. Stein (1991) “Leverage and house-price dynamics in U.S. cities,” Rand
Journal of Economics, 30, 498—514.
Levene, H. (1960) “Robust tests for the equality of variances,” In Olkin I, Ghurye S. G.,
Hoeﬀding W., Madow, W. G., and Mann H. B. (eds.) “Contributions to Probability and
Statistics: Essays in Honor of Harold Hotelling,” Stanford University Press.
Li, W., and R. Yao (2007), “The life-cycle eﬀects of house price changes,” Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 39, 1375-1409.
Ljungqvist, L., and T. J. Sargent (2004) “Recursive macroeconomic theory, Second Edi-
tion,” MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
MacDonald, R., and M. Taylor (1993) “Regional house prices in Britain: Long-run rela-
tionships and shurt-run dynamics,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 40, 43—55.
Malpezzi, S. (1999) “A simple error correction model of house prices,” Journal of Housing
Economics, 8, 27—62
Malpezzi, S., G. Chun, and R. Green (1998) “New place-to-place housing price indexes
for US metropolitan areas, and their determinants,” Real Estate Economics, 26, 235—274.
Mayer, C., and T. Somerville (2000) “Land use regulation and new construction,” Regional
Science and Urban Economics, 30, 639—662.
Meen, G. (2002) “The time-series behavior of house prices: A transatlantic divide?,”
Journal of Housing Economics, 11, 1—23.
54Muellbauer, J., and A. Murphy (1997) “Booms and Busts in the UK Housing Market,”
Economic Journal, 107, 1701—1727.
Nechyba, T. (2000) “Mobility, targeting and private-shool vouchers,” American Economic
Review, 90, 130—146.
Ortalo-Magné, F., and S. Rady (2006) “Housing market dynamics: on the contribution
of income shocks and credit constraints,” Review of Economic Studies, 73, 459—485.
–– (2008) “Heterogeneity within communities: A stochastic model with tenure choice,”
Journal of Urban Economics, 64, 1—17.
Pollakowski, H. O., and T. S. Ray (1997) “Housing price diﬀu s i o np a t t e r n sa td i ﬀerent
aggregation levels: An examination of housing market eﬃciency,” Journal of Housing
Research, 8, 107—124.
Poterba, J. (1984) “Tax subsidies in owner-occupied housing: an asset-market approach,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, 729—752.
Ranney, S. (1981) “The future house prices, mortgage market conditions, and the returns
to homeownership,” American Economic Review, 71, 323—333.
Reardon, S. F., and G. Firebaugh (2002) “Measures of multigroup segregation,” Sociolog-
ical Methodology, 32, 33—67.
Rhode, P. W., and K. S. Strumpf (2003) “Assessing the importance of Tiebout sorting:
local heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990,” American Economic Review, 93, 1648—1677.
Ross, S., and J. Yinger (1999) “Sorting and voting: a review of the literature on urban
public ﬁnance,” In Cheshire, P., and Mills, E. S. (eds.) Handbook of Regional and Urban
Economics, North-Holland.
Saiz, A. (2008) “On Local Housing Supply Elasticity,” Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1193422.
55Shiller, R. J. (1993) “Macro markets: Creating institutions for managing society’s largest
economic risks,” Oxford University Press, United Kingdom.
–– (2003) “The new ﬁnancial order: Risk in the 21st century,” Princeton University
Press, USA.
Shiller, R. J., and A. Weiss (1999) “Home equity insurance,” Journal of Real Estate
Finance and Economics, 19, 21—47.
Sinai, T., and N. S. Souleles (2005) “Owner-occupied housing as a hedge against rent
risk,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 763—789.
Titriroglu, D. (1992) “Eﬃciency in housing markets: Temporal and spatial dimensions,”
Journal of Housing Economics, 2, 270—292.
Wheaton, W. C. (1990) “Vacancy, search, and prices in a housing market matching
model,” Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1270—1292.
–– (1993) “Land capitalization, Tiebout mobility, and the role of zoning regulations,”
Journal of Urban Economics, 34, 102—117.
Williams, J. T. (1995) “Pricing real assets with costly search,” Review of Financial Stud-
ies, 8, 55—90.
56Tables




New York 5.3 12.0
Los Angeles 6.7 11.1
San Diego 6.7 9.6
Source: Malpezzi, 1999
57Table 2. Correlation between sorting measures and house price volatility
Sorting measure Income Education Age
Dissimilarity index, D −0.19 −0.14 −0.12
Gini index, GC −0.16 −0.13 −0.12
Theil information theory index, T −0.20 −0.17 −0.14
Notes: Correlations are reported between the house price volatility and sorting mea-
sures for income, education and age. The sorting measure varies by row. See the
text for the formulae of the measures. Sample size is 242.
58Table 3. OLS regressions of sorting measures on house price volatility and selected
covariates
Dependent variable: Sorting index of
Income Education Age
Independent variable (1) (2) (3)
Constant .026∗∗∗ .035∗∗∗ .015∗∗∗
(0.003) (.004) (.003)
House price volatility −.039∗∗∗ −.115∗∗∗ −.045∗∗∗
(.013) (.034) (.016)
Number of municipalities .007∗∗∗ −.002 .0005
(.002) (.003) (.002)
Average size of municipalities −.004∗∗∗ −.002∗∗ −.0004
(.0007) (.001) (.0006)
Population density in MSA .033∗∗ .039∗ −.013
(.014) (.023) (.010)
Land area of MSA .002∗∗∗ .006∗∗∗ .0017∗
(.0007) (.002) (.0009)
Number of families in MSA −.0136∗ .017 −.003
(.007) (.90) (.006)
R2 .363 .195 .056
Notes: Dependent variable varies by column. “Income”, “Education” and “Age”
indicate the measures in (21) computed for income (with 25 groups), education
(with three groups), and age (with ﬁve groups), respectively. Precise deﬁnitions of
the groups in each case are given in the appendix. “House price volatility” is deﬁned
in the text. “Number of municipalities” is the number of MCDs divided by 100,
“Average size. of municipalities” is the average population of MCDs (divided by
10000), “Population density in MSA” is the number of families in MSA per square
kilometer (divided by 1000) ,“ L a n da r e ao fM S A ”i st h es i z eo fM S Aa r e ai ns q u a r e d
kilometers (divided by 10000). “Number of families in MSA” is the size of MSA
59population (in millions). The standard deviations of the applied variables are .013,
.022, .012 for the dependent variables (from column (1) to column (3)), and .039,
.581, 1.22, .076, 1.19, .200 for the regressors (top to bottom). The White’s robust
standard errors for the coeﬃcient estimates are reported in parentheses. The ***,
** and * indicates statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Sample size is 242.
60Table 4. Sorting of movers and stayers
Owners Renters All
Movers Stayers Movers Stayers Movers Stayers
Income .080 .043 .063 .130 .044 .036
Education .063 .046 .063 .063 .054 .044
Age .020 .013 .020 .036 .015 .011
Notes: The entries of the table refer to the Theil information theory index in (21)
computed for the whole US using PUMA level data from the 1990 Census. Precise
deﬁnitions of the groups in each of the cases (education, age, income) are given in
the appendix.





Notes: The entries of the table refer to the Theil information theory index in (21)
computed for the whole US using PUMA level data from the 1990 Census. Precise
deﬁnitions of the groups in each of the cases (education, age, income) are given in
the appendix.
62Table 6. Comparing movers and stayers
Mean Std. deviation Tests for equal variance
Movers Stayers Movers Stayers Levene Brown-F.
Owners
High School degree, % 0.45 0.46 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.00
College degree, % 0.38 0.26 0.17 0.13 0.00 0.00
Age 42.35 6 .23 .33 .00 .00 0.02
Income 46039 42021 15503 13113 0.00 0.00
Renters
High School degree, % 0.48 0.45 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.00
College degree, % 0.27 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.00
Age 37.65 3 .02 .54 .80 .00 0.00
Income 23405 21760 6924 6839 0.28 0.47
Notes: The entries of the table are computed using PUMA level observations (total
1726). Each PUMA observation is obtained by averaging relevant observations
(household heads) in the corresponding PUMA sample (from the 1990 Census). A
household head is classiﬁed as a mover (a stayer), if he or she did not live (lived)
in his or her current house ﬁve years ago. “High school degree, %” refers to the
share of persons with a high school degree but not a college degree, “College degree,
%” refers to the share of persons with at least a college degree, “Age” refers to
the average age in years, while “Income” refers to the average annual income of
household heads. (See the text for more detailed description of the variables.)
“Levene” and “Brown-F.”, respectively, refer to the p-values of the Levene (1960)



















Source: Nationwide Building Society












US average = 1
Source: Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight and 
Malpezzi et al. (1998)
Figure 2: Relative house prices in the US
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Figure 3: The θ
∗
n-curve when θ is uniformly distributed on [−1
2, 1










































h = 0 h = 1
Figure 4: Equilibrium pattern of residential sorting with diﬀerent values of the regional
shock, ε, when the match, θ, is uniformly distributed on [−1
2, 1
2], β = .95,a n dπ = .2.
In each panel, the cumulative wealth (match) distribution is measured on the horizontal




67Figure 5: Equilibrium distribution of wealth, match and location, with two values of the
regional shock, ε, when the match, θ, is governed by a four-state Markov process. The
match realizations are θ1 = −1
2,θ 2 = −1
6,θ 3 = 1
6,θ 4 = 1
2 and the associated transition










⎦ (when the match changes for household speciﬁc










⎦ (when the match changes due to a regional shock).
In steady state the mass of each realization is 1
4. The remaining parameters of the model





68Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE) was founded in 1998 by the
departments of economics at the Turku School of Economics, Åbo
Akademi University and University of Turku. The aim of the
Centre is to coordinate research and education related to
economics in the three universities.
Contact information: Aboa Centre for Economics, Turku School of
Economics, Rehtorinpellonkatu 3, 20500 Turku, Finland.
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE) on Turun kolmen yliopiston
vuonna 1998 perustama yhteistyöelin. Sen osapuolet ovat Turun
kauppakorkeakoulun kansantaloustieteen oppiaine, Åbo
Akademin nationalekonomi-oppiaine ja Turun yliopiston
taloustieteen laitos. ACEn toiminta-ajatuksena on koordinoida
kansantaloustieteen tutkimusta ja opetusta Turun kolmessa
yliopistossa.
Yhteystiedot: Aboa Centre for Economics, Kansantaloustiede,
Turun kauppakorkeakoulu, 20500 Turku.
www.ace-economics.fi
ISSN 1796-3133